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Through empirical analysis, this thesis concludes that there is no certain 
relationship between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. military spending. 
Comparing two variables, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. military 
spending, this thesis found a striking difference between the Cold War and the Post-Cold 
War. Based on the variable findings, this thesis explores the implications for future tasks 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
China’s power in Asia has risen dramatically since 2002. In response, U.S. policy 
has emphasized a Pivot to Asia (or Rebalancing Policy), indicating increasing U.S. 
attention to its regional role. However, U.S. military spending in recent years has 
diminished under the influence of sequestration and other factors. During the current U.S. 
presidential campaign, some candidates have explicitly called for reduced U.S. military 
spending in support of South Korea (and Japan). If U.S. military spending decreases, the 
republic of Korea’s (ROK) financial burdens for the ROK-U.S. alliance could increase, 
and this could affect the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Therefore, this thesis will 
ask a vital question: How has U.S. military spending affected the cohesion of the ROK-
US alliance since 1953? 
This thesis will investigate whether a variation in U.S. military spending affects 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and identify relationships between the rise or fall 
of U.S. military spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
Previously, no studies have explored a relationship between U.S. military 
spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance is one of 
the strongest alliances in the world. Over the last 60 years, the strategic value of the 
alliance with the United States has increased to control the rise of China. However, 
during those 60 years, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance has not maintained its 
strength. Historically, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance has repeatedly risen or 
fallen due to several factors. Many early scholars have focused on the changing strategic 
value of the ROK-U.S. alliance as a cause of alliance cohesion to rise or fall. Other 
scholars have determined that the ROK’s perception change toward the alliance has 
caused alliance cohesion to rise or fall. These prior studies analyzed the influence of their 
independent variables to the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and divided the cohesion 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance by rise and fall into two simple levels.  
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Due to recent challenges of China, the United States has experienced financial 
difficulties that have affected the alliance.  Because defense cost-sharing for the alliance 
is an important factor for the solidarity of the alliance, U.S. military spending could be a 
vital agent of cohesion. Previous research has not provided any credible predictions 
regarding the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and few studies have focused on the 
effect of U.S. military spending toward the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
Therefore, this thesis is important to future studies with regard to the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
This thesis will utilize empirical analysis to distinguish the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance using more defined levels than prior studies, and will focus on identifying 
the relationship of cohesion to U.S. military spending. In addition, this thesis will 
determine which of three categories of U.S. military spending has most influence on the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the relation between U.S. military 
spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. After researching prior studies 
related to this objective, this review will posit using five component parts: definition of 
alliance, definition of alliance cohesion, the ROK-U.S. alliance, cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance, and U.S. military spending for alliances in general. 
1. Definition of Alliance 
As alliance is not an easy term to understand, this thesis will attempt to clarify the 
concept of alliance to avoid further confusion in reference to alliance cohesion. George 
Liska mentioned that, “It is impossible to speak of international relations without 
referring to alliances.”1 He defines an alliance as “an event in politics as is conflict; it 
associates like-minded actors in the hope of overcoming their rival.”2 
                                                 
1George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962), 3.  
2Ibid.  
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While Liska emphasized the importance of alliance in international relations, Ole 
R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan defined an alliance as “a formal 
agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.”3 
Glenn H. Snyder tried to distinguish an alliance from an alignment.4 Glenn Snyder 
defined an alliance as “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military 
force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership,” while 
defining alignment as “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or 
opposed by other states in future interaction.”5  
By contrast, Stephen M. Walt defined an alliance as a “formal or informal 
arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”6 The 
definition of Walt embraces both informal and formal arrangements with regard to 
security cooperation; however, the definition is ambiguous regarding the coalition that 
could develop political or military cooperation for specific objectives.7  
To deal with the ROK-U.S. alliance, this thesis will follow the definition of 
Snyder because it does not have any ambiguity, and is the best option to apply the ROK-
U.S. alliance. 
2. Definition of Alliance Cohesion  
Based on previous definitions of alliance, this thesis will review a core term, 
alliance cohesion, and include valuable definitions by prominent scholars. Liska tried to 
explain the “conditions of alliance cohesion and efficacy by using the cause of making 
and breaking alliance instead of explaining directly.”8 Liska argued that the conditions of 
alliance cohesion were determined by “ideologies and diplomatic style, capability and 
                                                 
3Ole R. Holsti, et al., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1985), 4. 
4Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 6.   
5Ibid., 4–6. 
6Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 12.  
7Hyo-keun Jee, “Alliance Security Culture and Alliance Cohesiveness: A Case Study on ROK-U.S. 
Alliance, 1968–2005” (PhD dissertation, The Graduate School of Yonsei University, 2004), 20. 
8Liska, Nation in Alliance, 61.  
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pressure, and pretension and coercion,”9 while the conditions of alliance efficacy were 
determined by “integration and interdependence, deterrence and auxiliaries, and restraints 
among allies.”10 Liska also claimed that, “demands of the alliance cohesion concur with 
alliance efficacy.”11  
By contrast, Holsti et al. distinguished “three types of definitions of alliance 
cohesion.”12 The first definition is “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals, 
strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward those end.”13 The second 
is to “overlap with alliance efficacy, the ability of the alliance to achieve its goals.”14 The 
last is an “antonym of disintegration, the ability of the coalition to survive.”15 Under 
these definitions, Holsti et al.argued that, “the alliance cohesion is determined by threat, 
decision-making structure, alliance duration, and disintegration.”16 In fact, alliance 
cohesion could be affected by non-material factors like the perception change of states 
within alliances and domestic politics; however, Holsti focused on material factors to 
determine the cause of alliance cohesion. Thus, explaining the various factors of the 
alliance cohesion may be limited.  
Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen argued that the 
“cohesiveness or togetherness” is an essential character of an alliance, and “the degree of 
cohesion is related to its vitality rather than durability.”17 They determined that “common 
interests within allies affected the cohesiveness of alliance.”18 According to their 
argument, “by sharing common interests and achieving common goals, the cohesiveness 
                                                 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid., 61–157.  
11Ibid., 116.  





17Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics 
(Needham Height, NJ: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 288–289.   
18Ibid.  
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of alliance is getting bigger.”19 Alliances do not face the same external and internal 
environment, and elements of alliance cannot share the exact same interests and goals. 
Thus, elements of alliance should develop various tools to share and achieve common 
values for the strong cohesiveness of alliance. 
Snyder added to the importance of sharing common interests with regard to the 
cohesiveness of alliance. Snyder introduced two concepts; “the guarantee motive and the 
get help motive,”20 and he emphasized entering an alliance by using these concepts. 
Snyder argued that “sharing each interest make alliances strong, getting cohesiveness, 
while if there are not sharing their interest, states do not prefer to ally others.”21 This is 
because they know others among the alliance do not support its interest.22 In addition, 
Snyder emphasized on procedure of reassurance of the alliance and included “joint 
military planning, supporting ally in a dispute the third party or public restatement of the 
alliance pledge”23 by means of validation reassurance.  
As a result, the Snyder’s definition of alliance cohesion more accurately defines 
the ROK-U.S. alliance. This is because validated reassurance and sharing common 
interests are indispensable factors to the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
3. The ROK-U.S. Alliance 
This thesis will determine whether a certain pattern between the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. military spending exists. With the rise of China, prominent 
scholars have published valuable studies of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  This thesis explores 
many of the recent ROK-U.S. alliance studies related to the rise of China and external 
environments with regard to politics and the economy.  
                                                 
19Ibid.  





Ellen Kim and Victor D. Cha claim that the ROK could attain “positive sum 
gains” in the triangular relations with the United States and China.24 Even though the 
ROK has faced “four strategic dilemmas with regard to power, economy, North Korea, 
and entrapment in the ROK-U.S. alliance due to the rise of China,”25 its proximity to 
China does not separate it from the United States.26 In fact, the rise of China and the 
rebalancing policy of United States have escalated tensions in Northeast Asia, and caused 
difficulties with the ROK. This is because the ROK has had a complex interest in the 
relations between both super powers with regard to security and the economy, making it 
difficult to create a balance in a direction that satisfies each of them. Kim and Cha argued 
that, “even though the optimum path for the ROK is to circumvent the four dilemmas, 
there is not enough space to manage these problems with the ROK.”27 Thus, the ROK 
and the United States should prepare and talk about the “dilemma together in order to 
achieve positive sum gains,”28 and U.S. alliances have to take a role to solve “complex 
patchworks in East Asia as part of Asia’s regional architecture.”29 
In addition, Scott Snyder argues that the ROK must pursue the “stable tripartite 
cooperation with China and the United States, rather than an alliance reaffirmation and 
separation,”30 to solve the problem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). In fact, cooperation with China is essential for the bright future of the Korean 
peninsula because China does not want to collapse the Kim regime of DPRK, but instead 
wants to maintain the status quo to use the DPRK as the buffer zone. Using this 
argument, China has continually supported the DPRK in spite of the enforcement of 
international sanctions to the nuclear tests of DPRK. Under this situation, according to 
                                                 
24Ellen Kim and Victor Cha, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Strategic Dilemma 





28Ibid., 121.   
29Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: U.S. alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” In 
Asia Policy 11 (2011): 28.  
30 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 178–
180. 
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Snyder, the desirable future of the Korean peninsula could result from the cooperation 
with ROK-U.S.-China by “mutual efforts to solve the crisis of DPRK,”31 and “the ROK 
should make clear of its posture not to pursue biased relations to a certain country, but to 
pursue cooperative relations with China and the U.S.”32  
In contrast to previous scholars, Jae-ho Chung argued that, “China’s view of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance will grow more negative and antagonistic in tandem with the overall 
power it gets to possess.33” To prove this argument, Chung created four periods to 
determine whether different views in each period define a relationship between China’s 
view and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. As a result, Chung claims that, the ROK 
should have trust-building and strategic communication with China to present a more 
favorable view of China to the ROK-U.S. alliance.34 However, Chung is concerned that it 
is hard to achieve a favorable view of China when a severe security dilemma exists 
between China and the United States.35  
Scholars commonly argue that the ROK must maintain cooperative relations with 
both China and the United States to assure a proper direction in the current complex 
circumstances in East Asia. Although this is one solution to solve the complex situation 
with the ROK, it is not easy to create optimistic and cooperative relations with both 
countries.  This thesis does not intend to solve this relationship problem, but the thesis 
focus on the relations between U.S. military spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance is directly relevant to this larger problem. The following sections will explore 
prior studies that focused on measuring the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.     
4. Cohesion of the ROK-U.S. Alliance 
This thesis focuses on measuring the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance using 
more delicate levels compared to previous studies. Even though there are studies for the 
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cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, they focused on factors such as change of the ROK’s 
perception toward the alliance or the strategic value change of the alliance in the U.S. 
side, and they did not try to evaluate the cohesion of ROK-U.S. alliance.  Although it is 
difficult to evaluate the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, several scholars did focus on 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and tried to determine indicators to measure that 
cohesion. These studies do add valuable meaning to this thesis.    
Victor D. Cha argued that ten indicators can be used to assess the success of 
alliance for the United States. A successful alliance “deters aggression, facilitates U.S. 
power accretion and projection, shares risks and costs among the parties, enables 
common tactics and doctrine through joint training, promotes a division of security roles, 
serves U.S. security objectives in the broader regional context, facilitates cooperation in 
production and development of military equipment, facilitates a reasonable quality of life 
and hospitable environment for U.S. forces stationed abroad, reflects shared political 
values, and elicits political support among domestic constituencies.”36 Cha concluded 
that the ROK-U.S. alliance satisfied these indicators for 50 years, even though several 
obstacles have been identified: “the gap of the common interest like military burden 
sharing, anti-American demography, and sunshine policy.”37  
In addition, Cha argued that the United States must provide more commitments 
toward the alliance to bridge the gap and lead to a direction of the future of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance that both sides want, and suggested two methods to show this commitment to 
Seoul.38 First is to provide “material evidences” for reassurance.39 He argued that the 
United States should upgrade U.S. military capabilities in the Korean peninsula to give 
reassurance to the ROK by maintaining funding to the peninsula, keeping “joint 
combined training, and improving intelligence sharing.”40 Second is to give “strategic 
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evidences.”41 He also argued that the United States must commit to change the vision of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance through rebalancing plans, which will give the ROK a bright 
“long-term alliance future” even after the unification of the Korean peninsula.42 The 10 
indicators were applicable to examining the ROK-U.S. alliance and determining methods 
to make a more cohesive alliance in the United States posture. Even though the study 
does not use statistical data to examine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance in the 
posture of the ROK, it is very meaningful to try to test the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance using indicators in the posture of the United States.  
By contrast, three South Korean analysts tried a different approach to examine the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Hyo-keun Jee argued that the alliance security culture 
of ROK played a crucial role in determining the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and 
revising the alliance security culture of ROK derived from the critical security crisis.43 
He asserted that the alliance security revised its image of interest and threat recognition, 
and its influence on the cohesion of the alliance.44 He demonstrated four vital events for 
the change of the alliance security culture: Nixon Doctrine and withdrawal of the United 
States Force Korea (USFK) in 1969, new Cold War caused by the Soviet Union’s 
invasion to Afghanistan in 1979, the democratization of ROK in 1987, and establishing 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the North-South Korean Summit in 1998.45  
Jee attempted to examine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance with four 
periods, each divided by vital events. He defined the alliance cohesion as the extent of the 
security policy corporation within the countries of an alliance.46 To measure the 
cohesion, he suggested four indicators: “troops and facilities of the USFK, alliance 
pledges of leaders, the extent of alliance institutionalization, and ROK-U.S. combined 
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drills.”47 According to his study, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance was the strongest 
in the early-mid 1980s, due to “dependent cooperation type,” because the rise of security 
threats caused by the Soviet Union and North Korea influenced change to the security 
culture of the alliance cohesion in a positive way.48 By contrast, the cohesion was 
weakest in the early-mid 2000s, due to “independent conflict type,” because of the 
revised U.S. security policy after 9/11 terror, sunshine policy by Kim Da-Jung and Roh 
Moo-Hyun, and the pursuing expansion of autonomy in ROK that influenced the alliance 
security culture in negative way.49 
 Jee suggested that the ROK-U.S. alliance should become a symmetric type 
because the alliance could return to the “dependent conflict type” in 1980 due to the 
development of the ROK.50 Thus, he concludes that the attitude of the United States that 
recognizes Korea as an authentic partner is important to strengthen the cohesion of ROK-
U.S. alliance.51 While Cha focus on the commitments of the United States for the success 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance by both material and strategic evidences, Jee emphasized the 
alliance security culture, which influenced the cohesion of the alliance through 
constructivism. Jee’s study is also meaningful because he tried to examine the cohesion 
of ROK-U.S. alliance through four divided periods; however, he did not have any 
statistical data, and thus his research defined only a single case study related to the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
Another Korean, Bon-cheul Koo, asserted that many studies about the cohesion of 
an alliance focused on the material factors like power, threat, and self-interest, and 
realistically, the factors did not explain the East Asia alliance cohesion.52 Koo argued that 
collective identity played a crucial role in determining the cohesion of the alliance, and 
the revised collective identity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROK 
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influence on the cohesion of both ROK-U.S. alliance and PRC-DPRK alliance.53 Koo 
utilized three indicators to gauge the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance: “Compromise 
on security issues, military exchange and assistance, and economic contribution to mutual 
security.”54 As a result, he concluded that the ROK’s economic development, 
democratization, and globalization created a new collective identity, and allowed the 
ROK-U.S. alliance to move closer to a cohesive direction.55 Koo’s study was similar to 
Jee’s in that it focused on constructivist perspectives rather than realistic perspectives. 
However, Koo’s study included both the ROK-U.S. alliance and the PRC-DPRK alliance, 
and focused on identifying the state identity rather than evaluating the cohesion of the 
alliances. In addition, his finding of the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance was more 
optimistic than those of Cha and Jee, focusing on a short period after the end of the Cold 
War.         
Contrary to Jee and Koo, who focused on the ROK’s constructivist values as vital 
determinants of the cohesion of ROK-U.S. alliance cohesion, Kwang-il Noh emphasized 
a “dominant U.S. threat perception.”56 Noh argued that the dominant U.S. threat 
perception played a crucial role in determining the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, 
and the change of the perception derived from major crises of the United States.57 He 
introduced five major events that affected the dominant U.S. threat perception: “Détente 
with the USSR, second Cold War by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, collapse of the 
Soviet Union and 9/11 attack, and political and economic rise of China.”58 Using these 
five events, he divided five periods to examine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance: 
1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.59  
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To evaluate the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, Noh utilized four indicators: 
“official statements and document by leaders, combined exercise and operations, the 
institutionalization of the alliance, and combined military capability.”60 After evaluating 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance with four indicators, he concluded that the 1980s 
and 2010s were the strongest periods of the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, but the 
1970s, 1990s, and 2000s were the weak periods.61 He asserted that major drivers for the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance were not the ROK’s variables, but U.S. variables.62 
This study was unique because most studies that were implemented about the cohesion of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance focused on the ROK’s perception within the constructivist 
perspective. By contrast, Noh emphasized the role of the dominant U.S. perception as his 
independent variable. In addition, to evaluate the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, he 
utilized similar indicators with Jee such as statements of leaders, institutionalization of 
the alliance, and the ROK-U.S. combined exercise and capacity. Evaluating the four 
indicators of these prior studies adds substance to prior assessments of the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance.   
In summation, a number of studies have evaluated the ROK-U.S. alliance 
cohesion. Different independent values play a crucial role in determining the cohesion of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance in their articles.  However, with the exception of Cha, they 
emphasized the constructivist variables by criticizing the alliance studies that focused on 
the realistic variables. When it comes to the ROK-U.S. alliance, realistic values, like 
military burden sharing and commitments to the alliance, are becoming increasingly more 
important to make the alliance cohesion strong. Constructivist values cannot be empirical 
because they do not have empirical evidence for their independent variables. Thus, the 
thesis will utilize the U.S. military spending as an independent variable, and figure out 
the relation between the U.S. military spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance.  
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5. U.S. Military Spending for Allies 
While there are few studies that evaluated the relationship between U.S. military 
spending and the ROK-U.S. alliance cohesion, a few South Koreans have researched the 
defense cost-sharing issue of the ROK-U.S. alliance. These studies attempted to 
determine the causes of the inappropriate defense cost sharing hitherto, and better 
directions for proper defense cost sharing in the future. According to Myung-gun Lee, the 
ROK has charged more defense cost sharing for the ROK-U.S. alliance in consideration 
of relative economic capacity compared to Germany and Japan,63 and demands of the 
United States to increase the defense cost sharing could make challenges to the ROK-
U.S. alliance.64 He suggested five solutions for better defense cost sharing: compiling an 
expert group, careful management of ROK government, transparency of the decision 
making and negotiation, emphasis on economic approach, and efforts to not overlook 
direct or indirect support.65  
Won-gon Park asserted that defense cost sharing plays a crucial role in the 
continuation of the ROK-U.S. alliance because the result of the cost-sharing negotiation 
can be an accurate parameter in examining commitments for the alliance to both 
governmental and domestic public opinion.66 To create a more prosperous negotiation, he 
suggested that the ROK and the United States should bridge the gap of opinion toward 
defense cost sharing by considering the economic situation and changes to the security 
environment on both sides.67 To summarize their arguments, defense cost sharing is a key 
factor in examining commitments toward the alliance, and appropriate cost-sharing 
negotiations help to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, unlike the focus of this 
thesis, their emphasis was on the effect of the defense burden sharing to the ROK-U.S. 
alliance provided limited results.     
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Contrary to the studies with regard to defense cost sharing for the ROK-U.S. 
alliance, Japanese scholar Yuki Tatsumi researched the impact of U.S. military budget 
cuts to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tatsumi argued that the U.S. military budget cut could 
provide a new opportunity for the U.S.-Japan alliance to deepen in the future.68 The U.S. 
military budget cuts could weaken the U.S. military’s ability to defend Japan from North 
Korea and China and affect Japan’s confidence about the U.S. commitments. However, 
Tatsumi argued that both governments could solve this problem through frank 
discussions to reassure Japan that taking further steps would “forge a shared strategy for 
the future” in spite of the bad financial situation of both.69 When it comes to U.S. military 
budget cuts, Japan cannot afford to take on a greater share of the budget for the alliance, 
and the ROK-U.S. alliance faces similar difficulties as well. This study has a vital 
implication that the methods to overcome these challenges, like frank discussion, also 
will be helpful to the ROK-U.S. alliance.  However, Tatsumi’s study just focuses on the 
future of the U.S.-Japan alliance without presenting real evidence, and does not deal with 
the ROK-U.S. alliance.   
Unlike the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan bilateral alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is a multilateral alliance with 28 members. NATO has three 
unique budgets to pay for common activities; NATO and the United States share the 
largest portion of these three funds ranging from about 22–25%.70 Under the assumption 
that most members of NATO will diminish their defense budget in the wake of global 
financial crisis, Carl Ek casts doubt on the willingness and ability of NATO members to 
contribute to future alliance operations.71 Charles Barry and Hans Binnedijk argued that 
defense budget cuts by NATO members are creating more gaps between the United 
States and European countries within NATO with regard to defense ability and 
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cooperation.72 They asserted that NATO should implement a “smart defense” to 
overcome the crisis of defense resources, and create new organizations to change the 
specialization roles regarding defense budget issues.73  
Ted Galen Carpenter held a more pessimistic vision of NATO. He argued that 
there were two reasons for the United States to quit NATO.74 New members of NATO 
are weak and vulnerable,75 and “the defense-spending level and military capabilities”76 of 
NATO members have decreased. To sum up studies about NATO, military burden 
sharing among the NATO members plays a crucial role in the cohesion of NATO. The 
inclination of military budget cuts by European members had a bad impact on the 
military performance of NATO; continuation of this trend will influence the cohesion of 
NATO in a bad way.77  
There are three topics of studies with regard to the relation between military 
spending and the cohesion of the alliances: the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, and NATO. Even though they have different implications, the one common 
emphasis is on the influence of U.S. military spending toward the cohesion of the 
alliances. Studies of all three alliances have limitations regarding this thesis, which 
focuses on three categories of U.S. military spending, not just defense cost sharing or 
defense burden sharing. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
According to the literature review, the following factors are obvious: 1) U.S. 
military spending is one of vital factors that can potentially determine the cohesion of the 
U.S. alliance; 2) the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance has had periodic variations; and 
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3) there have been no studies to determine the relation between U.S. military spending 
and the ROK-U.S. alliance with statistical data. As independent variables for the study 
about the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the change of perceptions or strategic 
values to the ROK-U.S. alliance are limited in identifying the proper cause and effect for 
their arguments compared to studies that utilize statistical data.  
This thesis will collect statistical data about the three categories of U.S. military 
spending as potential independent variables. The research for the thesis will investigate 
the following three hypotheses (depicted in Figure 1), which may be mutually exclusive 
to some degree.  
 There might be a certain relation between total U.S. military spending and 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance  
 There might be a certain relation between total U.S. military spending not 
including with war supplements spending and the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance  
 There might be a certain relation between total U.S. military spending as a 
percentage of U.S. gross domestic production (GDP) and the cohesion of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance  




The independent variables (IV) are the three categories of U.S. military spending, 
and the dependent variable (DV) is the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. While this 
thesis may determine one or more valuable patterns between the IVs and the DV, it may 
also find no valuable pattern at all. Whether valuable patterns exist, however, this thesis 
may be meaningful to future research with regard to the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance. The fact that no pattern exists within this study can be a new and valuable 
finding to the academy.     
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research is based on “empirical social science.”78 According to Ung-jin Kim 
and Jee-hyee Kim, there are three characteristics of an empirical social science study.79 
First, social phenomenon is driven by the regular and repetitive order. Secondly, these 
researches pursue raw information through the process of analyzing the empirical 
validation of a causal type hypothesis. Finally, deducted raw information is limited to 
certain explanations or predictions of social phenomenon.80 This thesis undertakes 
empirical analysis research and does not seek to deduce an outcome by comparing other 
alliances or simply focusing on change of cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance with the 
passage of time. To create appropriate independent variables, this thesis analyzes the 
statistical data of the U.S. military spending. 
Initially, the research will examine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance from 
1953 to 2012. As noted above, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance will be examined 
by exploiting three indicators: the institutionalization of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the 
capacity of the United States Force in Korea (USFK), and the ROK-U.S. combined drills. 
Even though whole indicators enable this thesis to precisely examine the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance, this thesis will not examine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance 
for annual periods. This is because indicators could vary greatly within each year. For 
example, within a specific year, there may be no important event related to the three 
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indicators. These three indicators, however, are determined by the analysis of prior 
studies, and are the best tools to examine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance for the 
purposes of this thesis. As a result, the thesis divides the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance into more intricate levels than previous studies, and this thesis serves to 
demonstrate the credibility of this management of the data.  
Secondly, this thesis will explore the statistical data regarding three categories of 
U.S. military spending: total military spending, total military spending not including with 
the war supplement spending, and total military spending percentage of U.S. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). To create credible statistical data of U.S. military spending, 
this thesis will explore the National Defense Estimates Fiscal years (FY) 2013 and FY 
2017 by the Department of Defense (DOD), which contain a good history of U.S. 
military spending and deal with various categories of U.S. military spending. Moreover, 
this thesis will determine certain patterns between each of those military spending groups 
and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by comparing two categories of data. This is a 
vital part of this thesis because the objective of this thesis is to figure out relations 
between the U.S. military spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and to 
find vital implications for a future of the ROK-U.S. alliance cohesion with the U.S. 
military spending.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I contains six sections: the major 
research question, significance of the research question, literature review, potential 
explanations and hypotheses, research design, and thesis overview.  
Chapter II measures the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This chapter 
examines and qualifies the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance with three indicators, and 
each indicator has its own method to distinguish the level of the cohesion. After the 
analysis of each indicator, the three indicators of cohesion levels are summarized for each 
period, and a comprehensive cohesion level of the ROK-U.S. alliance from 1953 to 2012 
is created. Acquiring credible data related to the cohesion is important, because this data 
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is used to analyze and determine the relationship between the three categories of 
independent variables.  
Chapter III discusses the U.S. military spending. Three categories of total U.S. 
military spending are analyzed and the statistical data are compared and analyzed with 
regard to the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. After comparing the three categories, 
this thesis will determine whether a certain pattern exists between U.S. military spending 
and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
Finally, Chapter IV provides a four-part conclusion.  The first part is a general 
observation that synthesizes whole outcomes and compares them to each alliance 
relationship. The second part discusses implications for the future of ROK-U.S. alliance 
cohesion related to U.S. military spending, which provides valuable lessons to the foreign 
policy decision making of the ROK in today’s new security circumstances. The third part 
is an anticipation, which suggests future tasks for the ROK-U.S. alliance.  Finally, 
opportunities for future research on the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance are provided, 
which includes limitations of this thesis. 
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II. THE COHESION OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE 
This chapter measures the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance from 1953 to 2012 
through three indicators: the institutionalization of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the capacity of 
the USFK, and ROK-U.S. combined drills. The next three sections of this chapter 
consider each of these indicators in turn.  Within each indicator, the chapter determines 
intricate levels of the ROK-U.S. alliance cohesion across nine periods marked by the 
presidential administrations of the ROK. (The chapter divides the term of President Park 
Chung-hee into two periods because the length of his rule was much longer than other 
ruling periods, and the chapter sets the ruling of the President Park as starting after the 
military coup of 1961.)    
A. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE 
As noted in the literature review, Snyder emphasized a sharing of common 
interests and a reassurance to consolidate the cohesion of alliance. In addition, according 
to Robert O. Keohane, Helga Haftendorn, and Celeste A. Wallander, “institutions can 
promote reciprocity, make members accountable for their actions, and contribute to the 
maintenance of cooperative security strategies.”81 In order words, to consolidate the 
cohesion of alliance, elements of alliance should have concrete means of conversation to 
enhance reciprocity of common security goals, and institutionalization to allow elements 
of alliance to trust each other. Thus, the institutionalization of alliance could influence the 
sharing of common interests and valid reassurance. For example, the ROK-U.S. Mutual 
Defense Treaty signed in 1953 began the security cooperation system based on the 
Treaty.82 Despite characteristics of imbalance, the Treaty has proper provisions to 
promote cooperation between both countries against adversaries. As an example, the 
institutionalization of alliance has a great impact on the cohesion of alliance, which is a 
first indicator to measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
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To determine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by measuring the 
institutionalization, this thesis will divide the institutionalization of the alliance into 
defined levels in each administration of the ROK. In fact, it is hard to measure the extent 
of alliance institutionalization at certain levels, and no study has explored this until now.  
Because there are so many institutionalization events of the ROK-U.S. alliance, 
the chapter will identify the most vital events in each period. With this focus, the thesis 
will identify three levels of institutionalization of the ROK-U.S. alliance: cooperative, 
required, and disputed. Table 1 distinguishes these three levels of institutionalization, and 
this level will be determined for each of the significant events of institutionalization in 
each period.  
Table 1.   Three Levels of Institutionalization  
 Cooperative Required Disputed 
Mean Helpful to consolidate Necessary to progress 
Caused by 
dissatisfaction 
Level 2 1 0 
 
First is a cooperative institutionalization for the alliance, which consolidates the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and is expressed as a level 2. Second is a required 
institutionalization, which is necessary to equip the combined defense posture of USFK, 
and is expressed as level 1. Third is a disputed institutionalization, which is caused by the 
dissatisfaction of one side toward the alliance, and is expressed as level 0. Finally, the 
assessment provides a total accumulated level of institutionalization for each period. 
1. The Rhee Syng-Man Administration (1953–1960) 
The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty is not simply a beginning of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance, but also a creation of the “strong ROK-U.S. combined defense posture.”83 Near 
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the end of the Korean War, the ROK did not have enough military capacity against 
aggressions by DPRK, and thus, President Rhee had to sign the ROK-U.S. Mutual 
Defense Treaty to guarantee security of ROK by the United States. Under this situation, 
diplomatic efforts of President Rhee who wished to take guarantee from the United States 
helped to sign the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in spite of many obstacles. In fact, it 
took time to adjust the common interest, and eventually the Treaty took effect in 1954 
through the ROK-US summit in July 1954.84 The agreed minutes relating to continued 
cooperation in economic and military matters reaffirmed the delicate plans for execution 
of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in November 1954.85  
The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty consisted of the preamble and six 
provisions.86 In the second provision, the Treaty guaranteed that if the security of ROK 
were threatened by external threats, both countries would take proper actions together to 
handle this problem.87  Because the Treaty began the initial steps toward the 
enhancement of the ROK-U.S. alliance, it became level 1 of the institutionalization 
progress.  
In addition, there was another required institutionalization in this administration, 
which the USFK command was established in 1957. Though the Korea War ended, lots 
of USFK troops have stayed in ROK based on the Mutual Defense Treaty. To have 
effective commanding system, the foundation of the USFK command was inevitable, and 
this institutionalization could be regard as the required institutionalization. As a result, 
there were two required institutionalizations in this period, and the level of 
institutionalization is 2.      
2. The First Half of the Park Chung-Hee Administration (1961–1968) 
During the first half of President Park’s administration, there were two 
institutionalizations to the ROK-U.S. alliance in the first half of President Park; the States 
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of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and the defense officials’ talk. Under the Provision of 
Article 4 of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States could remain in the 
ROK.88 Both countries contracted the SOFA to define the legal status of the USFK in 
1966,89 prompting numerous debates between the ROK and the United States. Thus, the 
SOFA could be regarded as the required institutionalization, and would be expressed as 
level 1. 
In 1968, both countries began to having a defense officials’ talk to perform policy 
consultation with regard to the whole issues of both countries’ security and to mediate 
difference of opinions for the military cooperation.90 This talk could be regarded as a 
cooperative institutionalization because it is very helpful to share common interest and 
solve problems derived from the difference between both sides. In addition, it had 
developed to the Security Consultant Meeting (SCM) later and it has persisted until 
nowadays. Thus, this talk could be expressed as level 2, and the level of the 
institutionalization in this period is 3.   
3. The Second Half of the Park Chung-Hee Administration (1969–1979) 
Similar to the first half of the Park Chung-hee administration, second half of the 
administration prompted further toward the institutionalization of the alliance. A 
foundation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), and a construction of 
the combined command system, created a salient institutionalization during this period.91 
As a main body of the ROK-U.S. combined defense system, both countries made an 
agreement to activate the CFC by the 10th SCM meeting in 1977, and established the 
CFC based on the ‘1st Strategy Directives’ from Military Commitment Meeting (MCM) 
in 1978.92 Through the foundation of the CFC, the operation control authority transferred 
from a commander of UN forces to a commander of the CFC.93 This institutionalization 
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was a salient event for the ROK-U.S. alliance. This is because the ROK received strong 
assurance through this organization, and it is helpful to consolidate the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance. Through consolidation of alliance, the foundation of the CFC and the 
MCM in this period was regarded as the cooperative institutionalization, and would be 
expressed as a level 2. 
4. The Chun Doo-Hwan Administration (1980–1987) 
Both countries began discussing logistic support for the effective combat power 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance, making progress in two logistical areas in this term. First, was 
the War Time Host Nation Support (WHNS), which referred to “the military and non-
military support provided for the acceptance, transport and war-fighting of the U.S. 
augmentation to Korea during contingencies of war.”94 The WHNS created a first step 
toward an agreement through discussion at the SCM of 1985.95 Even though both sides 
did not sign up for the WHNS in this period, they created significant efforts to proceed 
for signing up. 
Next, were the arrangements prompted by the War Reserve Stock for Allies 
(WRSA), which define “war materials stored by the United States within allied 
nations.”96 The ROK Defense Minister and the US Secretary of Defense made 
agreements about the sale of the U.S. war reserve stock to the ROK in both 1982 and 
1984.97 Both counties made agreements to solve problems, as the normal process for 
sales took too much time due to required approval by the U.S. Congress, and it is hard to 
supplement insufficient material in the initial step of war.98  
Both institutionalizations of this period supported the same objective of effective 
logistic support to the ROK-U.S. alliance, and could thus be regarded as a single 
cooperative institutionalization, which would be expressed as level 2.          
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5.  The Roh Tae-Woo Administration (1988–1992) 
During the Roh Tae-Woo administration, the logistical support efforts continued, 
prompting each country to sign up for the War Time Host Nation Support (WHNS) at the 
1991 SCM.99 Even though the United States had started to resist this agreement, the 
agreement meant that the ROK was ready to give logistic support to the U.S. 
augmentation of troops in wartime. Adhering to this agreement prompted a consolidated 
alliance by creating regulations of logistical support to the U.S. augmentation troops.  
In 1988, the United States and the ROK signed the Mutual Logistic Support 
Agreement (MLSA) for “the purpose of mutual logistical support during war and 
peacetime combined exercises, training operations, and joint missions.”100 Through this 
agreement, both countries were equipped with better logistical support for the efficient 
operation of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This agreement could be regarded as cooperative 
institutionalization and would be expressed as a level 2.            
By contrast, the ROK-U.S. Combined Field Army (CFA) that was designated in 
1980 was dispersed in 1992,101 and the ROK army forces were able to promote further 
land force attacks against the DPRK. Even though disbanding of the combined forces let 
the ROK force take on more self-sufficiency for security, diminishing the USFK troop 
levels impacted the capacity of the USFK. Thus, this disbanding of the CFA could be 
regarded as a harmful institutionalization for the alliance cohesion, expressed as 0.  
Beginning in 1991, both counties began sharing costs for the USFK through the 
Special Measure Agreement (SMA). Even though this development indicated the ROK’s 
national power growth and the end of the Cold War, it prompted many debates between 
the countries regarding the compromise of a proper level of military sharing for the 
alliance. Thus, the SMA could be regarded as a disputed institutionalization and would be 
expressed as a level 0. As a result, the level of the institutionalization of this period is 2.      
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6. The Kim Young-Sam Administration (1992–1997) 
After the end of the Cold War in 1992, several changes were implemented 
regarding the ROK-U.S. combined command system. Among those, the transfer of 
Operational Control (OPCON) from the CFC to ROK Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) was a 
vital institutionalization during this period. Historically, President Rhee Syng-man tried 
to transfer the OPCON from the ROK to the United Nations Command (UNC) during the 
Korean War, and eventually the ROK armed forces decided to place control of the UNC 
through the ROK-U.S. protocol agreement in 1954. After the foundation of the CFC, the 
OPCON was transferred from the UNC to the CFC, and the peacetime OPCON was 
transferred from the CFC to the JCS of ROK in 1994. 
The peacetime OPCON transfer resulted from the wish of the self-reliance of the 
ROK, and it could be interpreted as not being helpful to consolidate the ROK-U.S. 
alliance. Through the peacetime OPCON transfer, the USFK would not take charge of the 
security of the ROK during peacetime anymore102, and rather the ROK took the 
responsibility for peacetime operational control authority after 1994. The end of the Cold 
War set the mood, in which domestic politics of the United States required reducing 
military costs, and a requirement of the peacetime OPCON transfer by the ROK allowed 
the President Bush to accept the ROK’s proposal easily.103 With dramatic economic 
growth and democratization, the ROK began to pursue self-reliance in the external 
environments that had been revised by the end of the Cold War. The peacetime OPCON 
transfer was regarded as the required institutionalization, and thus the level of 
institutionalization for this period would be a level 1.       
7. The Kim Dae-Jung Administration (1998–2002) 
During the administration of Kim Dae-Jung, in 2001, the second revision of the 
SOFA was applied through a long negotiation between both countries. Even though the 
first revision of SOFA had come in effect in 1991, criticisms of the first SOFA revision 
                                                 
102Ibid., 54–55.  
103Ibid.  
 28 
remained from the ROK.104  In addition, incidents by U.S. troops caused the ROK to 
have a negative perception toward the USFK.105 The negotiations and discontent of the 
ROK toward the USFK that prompted the second revision of the SOFA was regarded as a 
disputed institutionalization, and would be expressed as a level 0.  
Both countries issued the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), which defined an “effort 
to consolidate USFK military facilities and manage the USFK and ROK-U.S. shared 
facilities with higher efficiency.”106 This plan helped to diminish local complaints toward 
the USFK and minimize the anti-Americanism in Korean society.107 After the signing at 
the 33rd SCM in 2001, the ROK national assembly ratified the LPP in 2002. As a result, 
the USFK would return “a total of 33,000 acres that included 28 bases, facilities, and 
fields”108 to the ROK, and by 2001, gradually diminished other land parcels in Korea. 
Even though the LPP focused on the effectiveness of land use in the Korean Peninsula 
and enhanced the living conditions of the USFK, this plan forces the USFK to move to 
the south side of the Korean peninsula, and weaken the importance of the USFK against 
the attack of the DPRK. Thus, the LPP could be regarded as disputed institutionalization 
and would be expressed as a level 0 as well. 
8. The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration (2003–2007) 
Following his predecessor’s sunshine policy, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
emphasized self-reliance for the security of the ROK. As a result, President Roh 
promoted discussions about the wartime OPCON transfer, and through the preliminary 
agreement at the summit meeting in 2006, the U.S. secretary of Defense and ROK 
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Defense Minister agreed to the wartime OPCON transfer in 2007.109 The wartime 
OPCON from the CFC to the JCS of ROK was planned to occur by March 15, 2012.110  
Although the wartime OPCON transfer did not disband the ROK-U.S. alliance, 
the role of the USFK would transfer from lead to support with regard to the security of 
the ROK. This change was initiated by the ROK for furthering its self-reliance, and 
accepted by the United States. The diminishing dependency of the USFK was a desirable 
course to consolidate the cohesion without “the entrapment dilemma.”111 However, this 
was not like the peacetime OPCON transfer. Under increasing nuclear threat from the 
DPRK, both countries did not consider this decision thoroughly enough to avoid later 
delay of the transfer plan. As a result, the agreement of the wartime OPCON transfer is 
regarded as a disputable institutionalization and would be expressed as a level 0.       
Both countries supported the Future of the Alliance’s Policy Initiative (FOTA) in 
2003.112 Through this meeting, both countries agreed to integrate as the 2nd Infantry 
Division and moved to the southern part of the Han River, which meant that the USFK 
force did not lead the charge, but instead, provided a supporting role confronting the 
aggressions of the DPRK. By considering the tendency to increase self-reliance under 
new security circumstance of the world, this institutionalization was natural and closely 
related to the LPP. Thus, it could be regarded as a disputable institutionalization and 
would be expressed as a level 0.  
Finally, the United States suggested that ten missions by the USFK would be 
transferred to the ROK through the first FOTA,113 and both countries made an agreement 
for this transfer during the ROK-U.S. Secretary of Defense meeting in 2003.114 To 
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execute this plan, the United States attempted to modernize the USFK and ROK 
forces.115 Through this plan, roles of the ROK force expanded for the security of the 
ROK, and the role of the USFK gradually diminished. With the LPP, this was a required 
process to support the ROK-US alliance. Thus, the mission translation was regarded as 
required institutionalization and would be expressed as a level 1.            
9. The Lee Myung-Bak Administration (2008–2012) 
During the Lee Myung-Bak administration, the ROK-U.S. alliance continued to 
enforce security for the ROK. The wartime OPCON transfer was delayed until 2015 by 
the ROK-U.S. Summit in 2010,116 and the fear of the people toward the DPRK increased 
due to provocations and nuclear testing. Public opinion in the ROK sought response by 
the USFK and CFC against threats by the DPRK, and President Lee demanded that the 
wartime OPCON transfer to the United States be delayed. 117After consultation between 
both sides, President Obama and President Lee eventually agreed to the delay of the 
wartime OPCON transfer. This delay improved the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance 
because it derived from the recognition of the ROK of the importance of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance and the USFK. This delay, however, cannot be considered an institutionalization 
of the alliance because this is not cancellation of the wartime OPCON transfer but just a 
delay of three years. Thus, this delay could be expressed as a level 0. 
 The ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense minister meeting (2+2) has been 
commenced since 2010 to solve present problems with regard to the ROK-U.S. alliance 
and both secretary of defenses agreed to progress the Strategic Alliance 2015 at the first 
ROK-U.S. foreign and Defense minister meeting in 2010, which including the 
developmental plan of the ROK-U.S. alliance until the wartime OPCON transfer.118 In 
addition, both secretaries reassured the timeline of the wartime OPCON transfer at the 
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second ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Minister meeting in 2012.119 This 
institutionalization assisted in enhancing cohesion, and began preparation of the wartime 
OPCON transfer. Thus, it can be regarded as a required institutionalization and expressed 
as level 1. 
Finally, both Defense Ministers agreed to establish the ROK-U.S. Integrated 
Defense Dialogue (KIDD) to enforce the ROK-U.S. security consultation system.120 The 
first of these two-day KIDD conferences was held in Washington on April 26, 2012, and 
the second KIDD in Seoul on September 12, 2012. Because KIDD was regarded as the 
cooperative institutionalization, it would be expressed as a level 2. As a result, the level 
of the institutionalization in this period was 3. 
10. Analysis of the Cohesion by Institutionalization  
This section will attempt to measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by 
adjusting the three levels of institutionalization in each administration of ROK. As a 
result of the alliance adjustment, the level of the institutionalization will be distinguished 
into 4 levels. The maximum level is 3 and the minimum level is 0.  
Table 2 displays an analysis of the cohesion of each administration by level of 
institutionalization. 
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B. THE CAPACITY OF USFK 
The capacity of USFK is a good indicator to measure the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance, and number of troops and equipment provide a measurement of that 
capacity.  Due to pressure from domestic politics and changes in strategic perceptions, 
the United States has repeatedly increased and diminished its troops and equipment in the 
ROK since the Mutual Defense Treaty. In addition, a bilateral alliance has been 
maintained by consultations and agreements between both sides, which were influenced 
by each side’s domestic interests and external circumstances. Through these negotiations, 
both countries were able to reach a proper level of capacity to satisfy both sides of the 
alliance. The ROK, however, has been perpetually threatened by the DPRK, so USFK 
troops and equipment have a vital role for the security of ROK in spite of the dramatic 
economic growth and military modernization of the ROK. Thus, the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops and equipment has a great impact on the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. For 
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example, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has weakened its cohesion since 1992 after the 
withdrawal of the whole US troops and equipment.121  
This thesis will determine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by measuring 
the capacity of USFK against two categories in each administration.  The first category is 
the USFK troop numbers, and the second is the equipment of the USFK in each 
administration. The withdrawal of USFK has historically resulted not from agreements 
between United States and ROK, but from U.S. foreign policies like the Nixon Doctrine 
and the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI). Due to this, USFK troop numbers have 
been a source of tension between both countries. Even though there have been periods 
when both sides reduced troops for strategic interests at the end of the Cold War, the 
level of USFK troop numbers have continued to be good indicator of the strong ROK-
U.S. alliance. This is because the United States could reassure the strategic value of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance to the ROK by maintaining and increasing the troop numbers of the 
USFK. Thus, this thesis utilizes troop numbers of USFK as an element to measure the 
capacity of USFK. 
The second category, the measurement of USFK equipment, explores the 
conventional and the nuclear equipment of USFK. Due to limitations to research the 
conventional equipment of USFK, it is hard to distinguish the rise or fall of USFK’s 
conventional equipment on the whole. Thus, this thesis will mainly deal with nuclear 
equipment of USFK as the main indicator.  
To distinguish the level of the cohesion, this thesis suggests a plausible method 
that distinguishes the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance into five levels. For instance, the 
thesis is going to measure as 2 when the USFK troop numbers or equipment had 
increased during each administration: 1 when the troop numbers or equipment had 
maintained: and 0 when the troops or equipment had decrease. Through the classification, 
the capacity of USFK can be divided as five levels in each administration. In addition, 
this thesis assumes that the level of troop numbers and the level of equipment can be 
calculated as an equivalent level unit, and an outcome of the levels appears a Table 3. 
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Table 3.   Five Levels of the Capacity 
Troops 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Equipment 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 
Level 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 0 
 
This classification could have many limitations of explanatory power due to 
overgeneralization. However, this thesis is a first trial to measure the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance with statistical data related to the capacity of USFK, and the thesis 
expects further progress to this study. Also, the thesis does not explore the cause of the 
rise or fall with regard to the capacity of USFK, and it emphasizes measuring the rise or 
fall of the capacity in each administration.  
Table 4 presents variations of USFK troop numbers from 1953 to 2012, and this 
thesis is going to measure the capacity of USFK based on the Table 4 and definite 
changes of USFK equipment, not including minor periodic changes. 
Table 4.   USFK Troop Number in the ROK from 1953 to 2012122 
Year Number Change Year Number Change Year Number Change 
1953 325,000 - 1973 42,000 +1,000 1993 36,500 - 
1954 223,000 -102,000 1974 38,000 -4,000 1994 36,500 - 
1955 85,500 -137,500 1975 42,000 +4,000 1995 36,500 - 
1956 75,000 -10,500 1976 39,000 -3,000 1996 36,000 -500 
1957 70,000 -5,000 1977 42,000 +3,000 1997 36,500 +500 
1958 52,000 -18,000 1978 39,000 -3,000 1998 36,500 - 
1959 50,000 -2,000 1979 39,000 - 1999 36,500 - 
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Year Number Change Year Number Change Year Number Change 
1960 56,000 +6,000 1980 39,000 - 2000 37,000 - 
1961 58,000 +2,000 1981 38,000 -1,000 2001 36,500 -500 
1962 57,000 -1,000 1982 39,000 +1,000 2002 37,000 +500 
1963 57,000 - 1983 39,000 - 2003 37,500 +500 
1964 63,000 +6,000 1984 41,000 +1,000 2004 32,500 -5,000 
1965 62,000 -1,000 1985 42,000 +1,000 2005 29,500 -3,000 
1966 52,000 -10,000 1986 43,000 +1,000 2006 28,500 -1,000 
1967 56,000 +4,000 1987 45,000 +2,000 2007 28,500 - 
1968 67,000 +11,000 1988 46,000 +1,000 2008 28,500 - 
1969 61,000 -6,000 1989 44,000 -2,000 2009 28,500 - 
1970 54,000 -7,000 1990 43,000 -1,000 2010 28,500 - 
1971 43,000 -11,000 1991 43,000 - 2011 28,500 - 
1972 41,000 -2,000 1992 36,500 -6,500 2012 28,500 - 
 
This thesis analyzes the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance through nine 
administrations of the ROK. Table 4, however, presents variations of USFK troop 
numbers annually, which could make short-term variations obscure longer-term trends in 
some specific periods. To make longer-term trends clearer, this thesis will use mean 
values of USFK troop numbers in some periods. Table 5 presents these mean values.  
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Mean value 36,700 31,300 28,500 
 
As appeared in Table 4 and Table 5, USFK troop numbers have changed since 
1953, and the thesis will analyze the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by using both 
tables and significant equipment changes of USFK.  
1. The Rhee Syng-Man Administration 
The USFK troop numbers diminished a lot during this administration as a result 
of the Korean War and the withdrawal of six divisions of the USFK by the United States 
between 1954 and 1955.123 Although the withdrawal of U.S. troops occurred without 
negotiations with the ROK,124  the ROK was compensated by the relocation of the United 
Nation Command (UNC) from Japan to the ROK, and the foundation of the USFK 
command in 1957.125 Through this course, both countries had reached agreements 
regarding the proper level of USFK troop numbers during the 1950s. As displayed in 
Table 4, the number of cuts was larger than other periods due to the end of the Korean 
War. Thus, the level of USFK troop numbers in this administration would be expressed 
as a level 0.  
Regarding the equipment of the USFK, tactical nuclear weapons in Japan moved 
into the ROK in 1957126 to fortify the deterrence against the DPRK under the enhanced 
weapon system of USFK, and to show the consolidated ROK-U.S. alliance figuratively 
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by locating these tactical nuclear weapons to the front.127 With the relocation of tactical 
nuclear weapons, the United States deployed nuclear-capable surface-to-surface Honest 
John missiles in 1958 and the squadron of nuclear-capable Matador cruise missiles in 
1959.128 As a whole, the relocation of the tactical nuclear weapons, along with other 
efforts, enhanced the capacity of the USFK. Thus, the equipment of the USFK increased 
during this period, and the USFK equipment would be expressed as a level 2. Lastly, the 
level of USFK capacity in this period is 2. 
2. The First Half of the Park Chung-Hee Administration 
During the first half of the Park Chung-Hee administration, USFK troop numbers 
increased. For example, the USFK troop numbers were 67,000 in 1968, 11,000 more than 
at the end of the previous administration; however, this increase was due to the Vietnam 
War dispatch by the ROK. 129  Although Figure 4 displays a definite increase of U.S. 
troop numbers, the dispatch of ROK forces in the Vietnam War was much larger. Thus, 
this increase did not strengthen the military power for the Korean Peninsula, and was 
somewhat regarded as compensation for the Vietnam War dispatch. As a result, the level 
of USFK troops would be expressed as a level 1.  
There were definite enhancements of USFK equipment in this period. The 
deployment of anti-air and surface-to-surface missiles, such as Nike-Hercules and 
Hawk,130 and the establishment of guided missile squadrons advanced the capacity of 
USFK much more than before.131 In addition, the USFK equipment was also 
strengthened by the deployment of 155mm Howitzer in 1964.132 With the deployment of 
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advanced weapon systems, the number of nuclear weapons increased by 950 during this 
period.133 Figure 2 displays the increase of nuclear weapons during this administration. 
Figure 2.  Number of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the ROK134  
 
 
With the increase of USFK equipment that occurred during this period, the level 
of USFK equipment would be expressed as a level 2. As a result, the level of the USFK 
capacity in this period is 3.  
3. The Second Half of the Park Chung-Hee Administration 
During the second half of the Park Chung-Hee administration, the USFK troop 
numbers diminished due to the Nixon Doctrine issued in Guam in 1991. The Nixon 
Doctrine confined the role of United States to deterrence, transferring primary 
responsibility for the security of other states to themselves.135 After the term of President 
Nixon, President Park was unable to maintain a good relation with President Carter due 
to his emphasis on human rights in South Korea rather than security issues.136 During his 
administration, President Carter issued a two-phased withdrawal plan of U.S. troops from 
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the ROK.137 Even though this plan had been opposed by the ROK and U.S. Congress, it 
was executed and followed until December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan.138 As a result, U.S. and USFK troop numbers diminished during this 
timeframe, and the level of USFK troop numbers would be expressed as a level 0.   
United States nuclear weapons that were located on the front north of Seoul 
moved to the Kunsan Air Base in 1975,139 and number of tactical nuclear weapons 
continued to diminish from 750 to 250 during this period.140 Under the Nixon Doctrine, 
the United States began to gradually decrease nuclear weapons in the ROK. Even though 
the ROK stored U.S. nuclear weapons in three areas, Camps Ames, Kunsan Air Base, and 
Osan Air Base141, “the storage sites at Osan Air Base were deactivated in 1977.”142 In 
addition, the decline and movement of U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK caused concerns 
over contingency usage of nuclear weapons.143 As a result, this gradual decrease of U.S. 
nuclear weapons weakened the capacity of USFK, and the level of USFK equipment in 
this period could be expressed as a level 0. Thus, the level of USFK capacity in this 
period would be a level 0 as well.     
4. The Chun Doo-Hwan Administration  
During Chun Doo-Hwan’s administration, USFK troop numbers gradually 
increased, even though the mean value of USFK troop numbers is lower than prior 
periods. As noted, President Carter planned to withdraw large numbers of the USFK 
troop in the late 1970s. With U.S. President Reagan and President Chun, however, this 
tendency of U.S. troop withdrawal was definitely reversed by the ROK-U.S. summit 
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meeting in 1981.144 Unlike the Carter administration that focused not on security issues 
but human rights, President Reagan emphasized the ROK-U.S. alliance to impede the 
movement of the Soviet Union into Asia.145 Under this intention, USFK troop numbers 
increased in this period, and it showed the strong cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
Thus, the increase in this period would be expressed as a level 2.  
Furthermore, the President Reagan expanded military supports with regard to 
advanced equipment of USFK. For instance, the USFK was equipped with advanced 
weapon systems including A-10 and F-16 squadrons and modernized these weapon 
systems during this period.146 In addition, the Reagan administration made enhancements 
to the nuclear capability of USFK.147 For example, sixty nuclear gravity bombs that 
could be loaded to fighter-bombers were allocated at Kunsan in 1985,148 enhancing 
USFK nuclear delivery systems. Through these enhancements, the ROK could feel the 
assurance by the United States to the alliance, increasing the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance. The further alliance cohesion of the ROK-U.S. through equipment meant this 
period would be expressed as a level 2, and the USFK capacity would be expressed as a 
level 4.    
5. The Roh Tae-Woo Administration  
During the Roh Tae-Woo administration, the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) 
decreased USFK troop numbers. Even though U.S. troop numbers decreased in 1992 as 
shown in Table 4, the mean values of U.S. troop numbers in the term of President Roh 
Tae-Woo was higher than the term of President Chun. In addition, this decrease of USFK 
consisted of non-combatant troops149 and U.S. forces in Philippine entirely withdrew in 
the same year. In consideration with a factor of the end of the Cold War in this year and 
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comparing other U.S. alliances, this result was interpreted as the minimum level of 
withdrawal. Thus, U.S. troop numbers in this period can be interpreted as being 
maintained, and the level of U.S. troop numbers can be expressed as a level 1.     
In 1991, the United States completely withdrew U.S. nuclear weapons in the 
ROK, in part to encourage the DPRK to end its ambition of nuclear armament.150 
However, the United States did not talk with the ROK enough with regard to the entire 
withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK, and the decision of this withdrawal was 
made by the United States unilaterally.151 This action would divide the cohesiveness of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance. Thus, the level of USFK equipment in this period would be 
expressed as 0, while the level of USFK capacity would be expressed as 1. 
6. The Kim Young-Sam Administration  
During the Kim Young-Sam administration, USFK troop numbers were 
maintained at 36,500. Followed the tendency with regard to the reduction of U.S. forces 
abroad, both sides had negotiated further reduction of USFK troop numbers by the 
gradual EASI plan.152 The nuclear crisis of DPRK, however, stopped the USFK 
withdrawal plan.153 In addition, the first East Asia Strategic Report (EASR), issued in 
1995, called for 100,000 U.S. troops to maintain stability in East Asia.154 Even though 
the further reduction of USFK troops did not occurred in this period, the mean value of 
U.S. troop numbers in the term of President Kim Young Sam is much lower than the term 
of President Roh Tae-Woo. As a result, U.S. troop numbers could be interpreted as being 
reduced, and the level in this period can be expressed as 0.  
When it comes to the equipment of USFK, U.S. President Bill Clinton had 
enhanced the equipment of USFK by adopting and expanding the Patriot missile systems 
against Scud missiles of the DPRK, the Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and AH-
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64 Apache attack helicopters.155 This enhancement of USFK equipment that confronted 
the nuclear program of DPRK could be interpreted as compensation for the entire 
withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK. Although the USFK troop numbers 
diminished during this period, the nuclear crisis with the DPRK forced the USFK to add 
advanced equipment. Thus, USFK equipment could be regarded as having been enhanced 
and would be expressed as a level 2. As a result, the level of USFK capacity in this period 
would be expressed as a level 2.      
7. The Kim Dae-Jung Administration  
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, USFK troop numbers were maintained 
due to the second EASR in 1998, which included the Comprehensive Engagement of 
U.S. forces in East Asia.156  With this report and the nuclear threat of the DPRK, USFK 
troop numbers were maintained during this administration in spite of the Sunshine policy 
and the first South-North summit meeting in 2000. Thus, the level of the USFK troop 
could be expressed as a level 1. 
With regard to the equipment of the USFK, there was no special alternation 
during this period. In fact, the enhancement of the prior administration—expanding the 
Patriot missile systems, the MLRS, and AH-64 helicopter—persisted in this period as 
well.157  Compared to the prior administration, however, the scale of this enhancement 
was not large. Thus, the level of USFK equipment was unchanged in this period and can 
be expressed as a level 1. As a result, the level of USFK capacity in this period is 2.   
8. The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration  
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, USFK troop numbers were decreased. 
In 2003, President George W. Bush declared the Global Defense Posture Review, which 
secured against new threats and enhanced the compatibility of the war on terror in the 
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Middle East.158 As a result, the United States declared that USFK forces would be 
reduced to 12,500 by June 2004,159 with plans to continue the troop reduction of both 
countries through 2008.160 With these plans, the USFK troop forces had diminished 
during this periods, and the level of USFK troops in this period could be expressed as 0. 
To compensate for this reduction of USFK forces, the United States enhanced the 
equipment of the USFK by modernizing the Apache helicopter, the Patriot-3 battery, the 
high speed vehicle (HSV), and the Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and 
Intelligence (C4I) system.161 Even though this development supplemented the reduction 
of USFK troops, it is hard to interpret this as enhancement of USFK equipment. Thus, 
USFK equipment was being maintained and would be expressed as a level 1. As a result, 
the level of USFK capacity in this period is 1. 
9. The Lee Myung-Bak Administration  
During the Lee Myung-Bak administration, the strategic value of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance increased significantly under the ‘Pivot to Asia’ of the Obama administration, 
and the USFK troop numbers were maintained at 28,500. In addition, there was no 
definite development of USFK equipment as well. Thus, both categories would be 
expressed as level 1, and the level of USFK capacity in this period is 2. 
10. Analysis of the Cohesion by the Capacity of USFK 
This section attempts to measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by 
summarizing the preceding assessments of levels of USFK equipment and troop numbers 
in each period. When these levels were increased, they were analyzed as a level 2. When 
they were maintained, they were analyzed as a level 1. When they were decreased, they 
were analyzed at a level 0. As a result, the level of USFK capacity of each period can be 
assessed at 5 levels, where the maximum level is 4 and the minimum level is 0. Table 6 
displays the summary of the preceding analysis of the cohesion by the USFK’s capacity.  
                                                 





Table 6.   Analysis of the Cohesion by the Capacity of USFK 





Decrease 0 Increase 2 2 
Park Chung-Hee 1 
(1961–1968) 
Increase  
 not 2 but 1 
Increase 2 3 
Park Chung-Hee 2 
(1969–1979) 
Decrease 0 Decrease 0 0 
Chun Doo-Hwan 
(1980–1987) 




 not 0 but 1 




 not 1 but 0 
Increase 2 2 
Kim Dae-Jung 
(1998–2002) 
Maintain 1 Maintain 1 2 
Roh Moo-Hyun 
(2003–2007) 
Decrease 0 Maintain 1 1 
Lee Myung-Bak 
(2008–2012) 
Maintain 1 Maintain 1 2 
 
C.  ROK-U.S. COMBINED EXERCISES 
As Victor Cha mentioned, “the common tactics and doctrine through the joint 
training”162 is one of vital factors for the success of U.S. alliance, and the ROK-U.S. 
alliance is as well. Because combined forces face many obstacles when deploying fire 
power due to the language and tactic differences, repetitive exercises are helpful in 
enhancing the operational capacity of these forces against threats 
ROK-U.S. exercises began in 1954 with the first Command Post Exercise (CPX). 
Because it is difficult to measure the cohesion of forces during these exercises, this thesis 
will use a measurement divided into scale and extent to measure combined exercises 
during each administration. The scale and extent can be considered equivalent level units. 
The five levels of combined exercises, along with their scale and extend quality, are 
displayed in Table 7. 
When a scale or extent has increased, it is considered a level 2. When a scale or 
extent has maintained, it is considered a level 1.When a scale or extent has decreased, it 
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is considered a level 0. In addition, the first administration could not been assessed by 
this method because there are no regular drills with large participation of ROK forces. 
Thus, the first period could be regarded as a minimum level with regard to the ROK-U.S. 
combined exercise. Using these levels, the ROK-U.S. combined exercises can be divided 
into five levels for each administration from a level 0 to a level 4. 
Table 7.   Five Levels of ROK-U.S. Combined Exercises 
Scale 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Extent 
quality  
2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 
Level 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 0 
 
1.  The Rhee Syng-Man Administration  
The beginning of ROK-U.S. combined exercise was supervised by the UNC at 
Tokyo163, and a few combined exercises had existed during this administration. There 
was no UNC in the ROK until 1956, and the UNC at Tokyo had supervised the initial 
stage of the combined exercise from 1954 to 1956. The first ROK-U.S. combined 
exercise was the Focus Lens exercise was led by the UNC headquarter at Tokyo, which 
started in 1954 as the CPX.164 After moving the UNC headquarter from Tokyo to Seoul 
in 1957, the UNC had commanded the Focus Lens exercise. Even though the Focus Lens 
exercise had been regularly implemented by the ROK-U.S. combined forces, the ROK 
forces had only participated to a minimal extent.165  
In 1955, there was a Field Training Exercise (FTX), the “Chugi or Autumn 
season.”166 This FTX, however, was not executed regularly by the ROK-U.S. combined 
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forces. As a result, this period had few combined exercises for the ROK-U.S. alliance, 
and thus, the combined exercise of this period is regarded as the minimum level, 
expressed as a level 0.   
2. The First Half of the Park Chung-Hee Administration  
During the first half of the Park Chung-Hee administration, the scale of the 
combined exercises increased due to the beginning of the regular FTX; however, the 
extent of the combined exercises had not changed during this period. Between 1961 and 
1967, UFL exercises were implemented bi-annually by the combined forces, and once 
yearly beginning in 1968. In addition, the first regular FTX, Foal Eagle (FE) training, 
started in 1961, which is for the rear area protection in small scale.167 One squadron each 
of ROK and U.S. participated in the FE training in the beginning, and its scale had 
increased over time. However, the Focus Lens and the Foal Eagle did not enhance their 
scale and extent much during this period. As a result, the scale of combined exercises 
increased due to the Foal Eagle training, and the extent was maintained during this 
period. This is because the extent of Foal Eagle training did not expand much compared 
to the prior FTX training in spite of their regularity. Thus, a level of the ROK-U.S. 
combined exercise during this period would be expressed as a level 3. 
3. The Second Half of the Park Chung-Hee Administration  
During the second half of the Park Chung-Hee administration, the ROK-U.S. 
combined exercises continued to expand in scale and extent. There were three definite 
developments with regard to both the scale and extent of the combined exercises. First is 
the beginning of the Ulji Focus Lens (UFL) exercise in 1976 by combining the Focus 
Lens and the Ulji exercise. With the foundation of the UFL exercise, dual exercise 
systems for the combined CPX were unified. Under this unified system, military 
exercises were led by the UNC, and civilian exercises were led by the government of the 
ROK.168 The UFL exercise included not only the military exercises, but also government 
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plans and mobilizing training.169 In addition, after the foundation of the CFC in 1978, the 
CFC led by the military exercise of the UFL, and it allowed the UFL exercise to develop 
much further through the certain command system.  
Second is the beginning of the Team Spirit, in 1976, which was a large scale FTX 
and “emphasized force flow and force-on-force operation.”170 The Team Spirit is an 
exercise to deploy and operate U.S. argumentation forces on the Korea peninsula 
whenever the ROK confronts conflicts with the DPRK.171 The beginning of the Team 
Spirit exercise had low participation in 1976, just 46,000 of the combined forces 
implementing an amphibious operation.172 But Team Spirit dramatically increased its 
scale and extent over time. As a result, in 1979 160,000 combined forces participated173 
and the air-ground operation and anti-submarine warfare were added.174 Even though 
there existed other FTXs during this period, like the Focus Letina in 1969 and the 
Freedom Volt in 1971, those were not regular exercises and the scale was much smaller 
than the Team Spirit. As a result, the Team Spirit exercise assisted in creating effective 
combined operations for defensive exercises, demonstrating capacity to the DPRK.  
Lastly, since 1976 the FE expanded from the small scale to large scale by the 
participation of both ROK and U.S. operation detachment teams.175 In addition, the FE 
expanded its extent to prepare for regular warfare during this period.176 With these 
developments, the combined exercises had increased in both scale and extent beyond the 
prior eras, and would be expressed as a level 2. As a result, the level of the ROK-U.S. 
combined exercises in this period would be expressed as a level 4. 
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4. The Chun Doo-Hwan Administration  
During the Chun Doo-Hwan administration, regular combined exercises, the UFL, 
the Team spirit, and the FE continued to develop during this period with regard to scale 
and extent. There were four enhancements with regard to the combined exercises. First of 
all, the UFL had expanded its scale and extent during this period by adding various 
enhancements of the exercise. First, the blackout and civil defense training were added to 
the UFL in 1982.177 Second, trainings for large-scale river crossings were added in 
1984.178 Third, the runway repair and counter-infiltration trainings were added in 
1985.179 Finally, the critical facility protection and civilian vessel mobilization trainings 
were added in 1986.180  
In 1987, the beginning of another CPX, the Focus Clear exercise, was led by the 
CFC. With this exercise, the combined forces could conduct combined CPX exercises 
twice a year, and begin to increase their scale and extents. 
Next, the Team Spirit expanded its scale and length, increasing from 145,000 
troops in 1980 to 218,984 in 1986.181 With regard to the extent, the Air-Land concept 
was added to the Team Spirit.182 In addition, the length of the Team Spirit expanded from 
10 days in 1980 to about 70 days in 1981, and 80 days in 1987. This large-scale 
expansion of the Team Spirit presented stiffer capacity to the DPRK than the combined 
exercises, increasing the strong cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
Finally, the extent of the FE expanded during this period through regular warfare 
and increased training of both parties.183 In addition, counter-terrorism training was 
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implemented in preparation for the Asian Game of 1986.184 With these enhancements, 
the combined exercises had expanded their scale and extent during this period, and would 
be expressed as a level 2. As a result, the level of the ROK-U.S. combined exercises 
during this period would be expressed as a level 4. 
5. The Roh Tae-Woo Administration  
During the Roh Tae-Woo administration, the scale of combined exercises 
diminished, marked by two distinct backward steps. First, the UFL exercise was divided 
into two parts in 1991, creating a military part and a civilian part. 185 Under this system, 
the scale of combined exercises diminished, and the implementation of the UFL in 1990 
was reduced under Roh’s northern policy.186 The regular combined exercises were a 
major indicator of the cohesion of the alliance. If the combined forces miss the regular 
combined exercise in specific year, it could be harmful to assure the strong cohesion of 
alliances. As a result, the UFL had weakened during this period with regard to its scale.  
Team Spirit had also diminished during this period. Until the late 1980s, the Team 
Spirit had maintained its scale with about 200,000 combined forces participating in the 
exercises,187 and increased its length by about ninety days since 1988.188 Its scale, 
however, had gradually diminished since the end of this administration, with both 
countries cancelling the exercise in 1992 due to negotiations regarding the nuclear 
program of DPRK.189 Insofar as the scale of combined exercises was influenced by the 
efforts to improve the relation with the DPPK during this period, the mean value of the 
scale of combined exercises during this administration was higher. Thus, the scale of the 
combined exercise would be expressed as a level 1.     
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During this administration, the ROK Navy participated in the Rim of the Pacific 
Exercise (RIMPAC), which was intended for multilateral exercises rather than the ROK-
U.S. alliance; however, it did not matter much to the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
As a whole, while the scale and the extent of combined exercises were maintained. 
Therefore, the scale and the extent would be expressed as a level 1, and the level of the 
ROK-U.S. combined exercise in this period would be expressed as a level 2.   
6. The Kim Young-Sam Administration  
During the Kim Young-Sam administration, the scale of the Team Spirit exercises 
diminished drastically in 1994. Three changes to combined exercises took place during 
this period.  During this period, the Team Spirit became a strong means of negotiation 
with the DPRK over nuclear programs, and had impacted the scale of combined exercises 
between 1976 and 1991.190 The Team Spirit was again implemented for a short period in 
1993, and was then dissolved.191  In addition, the extents of the combined FTX decreased 
due to the halt of the Team Spirit. 
In 1994, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) 
exercise was implemented. This exercise was a combined CPX that used computer 
simulators.192 Its objectives were to exercise with regard to wartime supports by the ROK 
force, mutual logistic support, and the mobilization and combat power restoration 
exercises of the ROK force.193 Although the ROK and United States wanted to substitute 
the Team Spirit with the RSOI, there were two reasons why the RSOI was not equipped 
to perform as well. First, the RSOI was not a FTX to exercise combined forces 
realistically but a CPX to use computer simulators. Secondly, the scale of U.S. 
augmented forces was 4,000–7,000, which was much smaller than the Team Spirit. 194  
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By contrast, the UFL unified its military parts and civilian parts in 1994, 
expanding its scale and extent.  However, because this unification did not influence the 
scale, the scale diminished and can be expressed as level 0. The extent was maintained 
due to enhancements of the ROSI and the UFL, and can be expressed as level 1.   
7. The Kim Dae-Jung Administration  
The scale and extent of combined exercises had not changed much during this 
period, and three major combined exercises, the UFL, the FE, and the ROSI, had 
regularly been implemented. The level of strength, however, had diminished because 
President Kim wanted to reduce tensions with DPRK under the Sunshine policy. For 
example, most of combined exercises had quietly proceeded without much media 
attention during this period.195 In addition, the ROK side did not participate in the 
combined FTX in 2000 due to the South-North summit meeting, and the FTX was 
executed by US forces mostly.196 Even though the scale and extent had not diminished 
during this period, strength level of the combined exercises fell during this period due to 
the reconciliation efforts with the DPRK.  
Additionally, in 2002 RSOI and the FE were unified to increase the effectiveness 
of the combined exercises.197 In addition, the DPRK was more sensitive about the 
combined FTX exercises due to the memory of the Team Spirit, so both the ROK and the 
United States agreed to integrate the two exercises to reduce the needless tension of 
frequent combined exercises. Although the objective of the RSOI/FE was to implement 
more effective combined exercises than the prior era, this result was not achieved, mainly 
because the RSOI and FE were different exercises. The combined exercises did not 
advance the quality of exercises during this period. As a result, the scale was maintained 
and can be expressed as a level 1, and the extent was decreased and can be expressed as a 
level 0. Thus, the level of the ROK-U.S. combined exercises in this period can be 
expressed as a level 1. 
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8. The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration  
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the scale and extent of combined 
exercises did not change; however, the UFL and RSOI/FE were regularly implemented 
by the combined forces. President Roh perpetuated the Sunshine Policy, and adjustments 
to the level of combined exercises were implemented in response to demands of the 
DPRK. Considering that the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, these 
adjustments weakened the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In addition, willingness 
for self-reliance during this administration prompted an agreement regarding the wartime 
OPCON transfer, and the combined exercises changed their name and methods in 
response to the wartime OPCON transfer plan in 2007.198  
The name of the UFL also changed to the Ulji Freedom Guardian (UFG), and the 
name of the RSOI/FE was altered to the Key Resolve & Foal Eagle (KR/FE). Both 
countries agreed that the ROK would officially lead the UFG exercises after 2008,199 and 
the JCS of ROK would manage the planning, implementation, and review of the 
exercises instead of the CFC.200 The USFK managed the supporting role with regard to 
this exercise after 2008.201 Even though both countries agreed that the USFK would 
officially lead the KR/FE exercises, the role of ROK forces also increased to prepare for 
the wartime OPCON transfer.  
Although both countries made an agreement with regard to this change in this 
period, this change did not influence to the combined exercises. During this period, both 
countries had executed two regular exercises, and the scale of combined exercises did not 
change as it had under the prior administration. The RSOI/FE, however, still could not 
substitute to various extents for the Team Spirit, and decisions to diminish roles of the 
USFK in the combined exercise were not helpful to create more effective combined 
exercises and consolidate the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance as well. As a result, the 
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scale could be read as maintained and can be expressed as a level 1, and the extent could 
be read as decreased and can be expressed as a level 0. Thus, the level of the ROK-U.S. 
combined exercises in this period can be expressed as a level 1. 
9. The Lee Myung-Bak Administration  
During the Lee Myung-Bak administration, the UFG and KR/FE regular exercises 
maintained their scale. However, the extents of combined exercises increased during this 
period. In 2009, the Max thunder training began, focusing on “striking package mid-
altitude infiltration training and enhancement of survivability and mission execution 
capability during infiltration,”202 enhancing the combined air operational capacity 
between the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) and the United States Air Force 
(USAF). The Peninsula Operations Readiness Exercise (PENORE) exercises “combined 
large force exercises, alert air interdiction operations, close air support operations, and 
counter-fire training between the ROKAF and the USAF.”203 The combined Anti-
Submarine Exercise (ASWEX) and the combined unconventional warfare training 
(Balance Knife) were begun and regularly executed during this period.204  
These new combined exercises increased the extents of the exercises, and 
reassured the strong cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance during this period. Therefore, the 
scale of combined exercises were maintained during this period and can be expressed as a 
level 1, and the extent of combined exercises were increased and can be expressed as a 
level 2. Finally, a level of the ROK-U.S. combined exercise in this period can be 
expressed as a level 3.   
10. Analysis of the Cohesion by the ROK-U.S. Combined Exercise 
This thesis has attempted to determine the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by 
assessing the three levels of both the scale and extent of combined exercises.  As a result, 
five levels distinguish ROK-U.S. combined exercises in each period. The maximum level 
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is 4 and the minimum level is 0. Table 8 displays an analysis of the cohesion by the 
ROK-U.S. combined exercises. 
Table 8.   Analysis of the Cohesion by the ROK-U.S. Combined Exercises 





Minimum 0 Minimum 0 0 
Park Chung-Hee 1 
(1961–1968) 
Increase 2 Maintain 1 3 
Park Chung-Hee 2 
(1969–1979) 
Increase 2 Increase 2 4 
Chun Doo-Hwan 
(1980–1987) 
Increase 2 Increase 2 4 
Roh Tae-Woo 
(1988–1992) 
Maintain 1 Maintain 1 2 
Kim Young-Sam 
(1993–1997) 
Decrease 0 Maintain 1 1 
Kim Dae-Jung 
(1998–2002) 
Maintain 1 Decrease 0 1 
Roh Moo-Hyun 
(2003–2007) 
Maintain 1 Decrease 0 1 
Lee Myung-Bak 
(2008–2012) 
Maintain 1 Increase 2 3 
 
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter attempted to measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance in each 
administration by adjusting three indicators: institutionalization, the capacity of USFK, 
and the ROK-U.S. combined exercises. To distinguish the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance more precisely, each indicator was assessed at one of five levels by its own 
methods. Although the methods used to divide cohesion levels in each indicator were not 
completely defined, no other study has explored these cohesion measurements with more 
precision than this thesis. Thus, the analysis with regards to the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance can be meaningful to develop future studies for the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
The cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance contained periodic variations as the thesis 
assumed, resulting in several significant findings. First, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
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alliance during the Cold War was stronger than the cohesion after the end of the Cold 
War. Secondly, the level of the cohesion peaked during the Chun Doo Hwan 
administration. Thirdly, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance weakened from the end of 
the Cold War during the Progressive governments of the ROK. Finally, the cohesion was 
strengthened during the Lee Myung-Bak administration.  
Figure 3 displays an analysis with regard to the cohesion the ROK-U.S. alliance 
in each administration, combining the findings for all three indicators. Using this 
information, Chapter III will focus on seeking relationships between U.S. military 
spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  

































The cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance 
Institutionalization Capacity of USFK ROK-U.S. Combined Exercise Total
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III. U.S. MILITARY SPENDING 
In Chapter II, this thesis measured the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance through 
three indicators, and created Figure 3 as a result. Based on this outcome, this chapter will 
determine the relationship between the cohesion of ROK-U.S. alliance and three 
categories of the U.S. military spending. The objective of this chapter is to determine 
whether or not certain patterns exist. 
A. TOTAL U.S. MILITARY SPENDING 
To have more transparency, the Department of Defense (DOD) of the United 
States publishes the National Defense Budget Estimates annually. With this data, it is 
possible to analyze the total U.S. military spending; however to acquire more credible 
data, analysts must determine the most valuable data from the findings.  Thus, there are 
several rules to determine the total U.S. military spending.  
First, this thesis uses the Total Obligation Authority (TOA) category, including 
three standard categories: “Budget Authority (BA), TOA, and Outlay.”205 According to 
the FY2017, “TOA is a DOD financial term expressing the value of the direct Defense 
program for a fiscal year, whereas BA is recognized by the general public as the amount 
of funding appropriated to the DOD by Congress,”206 since BA affects “a current year 
and future outlays, TOA affects the fiscal year.”207 To eliminate influences to future 
outlays, this thesis uses the TOA category with regard to the total U.S. military spending. 
In addition, according to the FY 2017, “outlay may represent the liquidation of 
obligations incurred over a number of years, and there is a time lag between 
congressional appropriations, obligations, and liquidation of obligations.”208 While the 
BA or Outlay may have influences outside of a fiscal year, the TOA is always related to a 
fiscal year. Due to this, this thesis uses the TOA category. 
                                                 
205Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimate for FY 2017 (Washington: Office of the 





Next, the thesis adjusts constant dollars to have data rather than current dollars in 
the first two categories of the total U.S. military spending. Even though current dollars 
have a merit considering the effect of inflation, total U.S. military spending data by 
current dollars is not proper for this thesis. This is because this thesis deals with 
numerous administrations. If this thesis uses current dollars, it would be difficult to find 
proper variations of the total U.S. military spending and compare data. Therefore, this 
thesis uses constant dollars in the first two categories drawing on data in the National 
Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013 and FY 2017, and adjusts to FY2013 constant 
dollars. 
1. Data of Total U.S. Military Spending 
To aggregate data with regard to total U.S. military spending, this thesis analyzes 
the TOA category adjusting the FY 2013 to constant dollars. In fact, to have data about 
authentic total U.S. military spending is difficult to research because immeasurable 
variables can influence U.S. military spending. This thesis, however, needs to have 
credible data that could represent variation of total U.S. military spending periodically, 
and this category of total U.S. military spending could be proper to serve definite 
variations in each period. Table 9 displays the total U.S. military spending in terms of 
TOA and adjusted by FY 2013 constant dollars. 
Table 9.   Total U.S. Military Spending TOA (FT 2013 Constant Dollars 
with Millions)209 
Year Total  Year Total Year Total Year Total Year Total 
1953 504,865 1965 424,367 1977 406,166 1989 540,004 2001 420,121 
1954 381,633 1966 501,858 1978 403,944 1990 525,426 2002 472,755 
1955 390,964 1967 540,377 1979 402,781 1991 531,581 2003 559,056 
1956 409,238 1968 546,853 1980 409,588 1992 480,350 2004 570,096 
1957 415,861 1969 543,490 1981 450,997 1993 450,504 2005 601,201 
                                                 
209Depart of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimate for FY 2013 (Washington, DC: Office of the 
under Secretary of Defense, 2012), chapter six.  
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Year Total  Year Total Year Total Year Total Year Total 
1958 415,414 1970 499,212 1982 496,858 1994 412,214 2006 621,989 
1959 410,400 1971 452,610 1983 529,392 1995 408,020 2007 681,758 
1960 388,531 1972 436,982 1984 553,710 1996 399,468 2008 736,359 
1961 415,419 1973 414,727 1985 577,427 1997 389,040 2009 719,861 
1962 447,017 1974 393,878 1986 568,479 1998 384,979 2010 730,715 
1963 435,928 1975 383,461 1987 561,953 1999 395,696 2011 713,194 
1964 435,236 1976 386,446 1988 551,743 2000 405,356 2012 660,360 
 
To compare between the total U.S. military spending and the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance, mean values of divided periods based on Table 9 could be valuable. 
Thus, this thesis calculates mean values of total U.S. military spending in each period, 
and displays the results in Table 10. 
Table 10.   Mean Value & Coding Level of Total U.S. Military Spending 




Park Chung-Hee 1 
(1961–1968) 
Park Chung-Hee 2 
(1969–1979) 
Mean value 414,613 468,382 429.427 








Mean value 518,550 525,821 411,849 








Mean value 415,781 606,820 712,098 
Coding level 1 7 10 
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As noted in Table 10, while the minimum mean value was 411,849 during the 
administration of President Kim Young-Sam, the maximum mean value was 712,098 
during the administration of President Lee Myung-Bak. The difference between both 
values is 300,249. To determine a pattern between the total U.S. military spending and 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, this thesis must divide mean values into 10 levels 
similar to the cohesion levels. Results are displayed in Table 10. 
2. Relationship Between Total U.S. Military Spending and the Level of 
the Cohesion 
To determine whether a certain pattern exists, this thesis compares the category of 
total U.S. military spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, both of which are 
divided into 10 levels. Figure 4 displays the compared results between these two 
variables. 
Figure 4.  Comparison Between Total U.S. Military Spending and the Level 
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3. Analysis of Figure 4 
This thesis found that ratios between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and 
the total U.S. military spending change over time. The ratios refer to a coding level that 
subtracts the level of the cohesion from the level of the U.S. military spending in each 
period. Variations of this coding level mean that there is no delicate relationship between 
these two variables. For instance, if there is a delicate relationship between two variables, 
ratios line in Figure 4 would appear as a straight line or a line with a shallow angle. As 
displayed in the Figure, however, the ratios change a lot over time, which means that 
there is a no certain pattern between two variables.  
Next, this thesis found that there is a striking difference between the Cold War 
and the Post-Cold War with regard to the ratios. Whereas the ratios of the Cold War 
appear as large positive numbers in Figure 4, the ratios of the Post-Cold War appear as 
small positive numbers or negative numbers for this category of U.S. military spending. 
Like the level of the cohesion, this thesis found the specific difference with regard to the 
ratios, which is a meaningful finding. To illustrate this finding more definitively, this 
thesis uses the term “positive tendency.” In fact, terms of a positive and negative 
relationship are imprecise in this analysis because the coding of two variables is rather 
arbitrary. Therefore, this thesis compares the tendency of each variable when two 
variables simultaneously rise or fall.  With this approach, the thesis is more guarded in its 
use of its data, but therefore can be more robust in its conclusions. 
This thesis found the positive tendency between both variables in the Cold War. 
Even though Figure 4 displays large gaps of each variable, a positive tendency is 
displayed in the Cold War for this category. For instance, while the level of the cohesion 
gradually varied from the administrations of President Rhee to the President Chun as 
levels 4, 9, 6, and 10, the level of U.S. military spending also varied positively with levels 
of cohesion as level 1, 3, 2, and 5. With this comparison, this thesis finds a positive 
tendency between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and total U.S. military spending 
during the Cold War. 
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By contrast, this thesis did not find the positive tendency between two variables 
after the Cold War. Even in a transition from President Kim Dae-jung to President Roh 
Moo-Hyun, this thesis found a negative tendency in the figure. There is no certain pattern 
between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the total U.S. military spending, 
because the ratios changed over time, as displayed in Figure 4. 
A factor to be taken into account is the dramatic increase of total U.S. military 
spending that occurred after President Ryo Moo-Hyeon. This thesis argues that this 
outcome could result from the war supplement spending for the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Wars. After the terrorist attack in 2001, the DOD of the United Stated added funding to 
support the global war on terror, 210 and thus adjusted the National Defense Budget 
Estimates.211 Because the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars increased this funding, the total 
U.S. military spending has gradually increased. 212 This funding, however, did not affect 
the ROK-U.S. alliance; therefore, this thesis must determine a more credible relationship 
between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the total U.S. military spending by 
counting out the war supplement spending after 2001. 
B. TOTAL U.S. MILITARY SPENDING NOT INCLUDING THE WAR 
SUPPLEMENT SPENDING  
As noted above, this thesis will estimate and subtract the war supplement 
spending included in the total U.S. military spending to create a more plausible outcome. 
In fact, this adjustment applies not to the whole historical war supplement spending of the 
United States but only the war supplement spending for the Iraq and Afghanistan War 
after 2001. There are three reasons for that. First, and most importantly, the thesis does 
not adjust for supplemental spending for the Vietnam War because this war was related 
with the ROK-U.S. alliance, including ROK troops dispatched to Vietnam as part of 
maintaining the security benefits of the United States. Thus, this thesis does not eliminate 
the war spending to the Vietnam War.  Second, the U.S. military spending used in this 
thesis is based on the Fiscal Year Budget Estimate by the DOD, and there is no available 
                                                 




data with regard to the Vietnam War and others in the Fiscal Year before 2001. Finally, 
this thesis is original in noting the dramatic increase of U.S. military spending after 2001 
and the need to eliminate influences of spending for the two wars.  
This thesis utilizes the total U.S. military spending using the TOA and FY 2013 
constant dollars. The National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2017, however, only 
provides comprehensive data related to the war supplement spending after 2001, and FY 
2017 does not provide data for the FY 2013 constant dollars. Thus, this thesis needs to 
transform the war supplement spending by adjusting the FY 2017 current dollars to 
match the FY 2013 constant dollars.  
The following equation displays this adjustment: 
Deflator = Current $ / Constant $ x 100213 
 
Deflator = FY 2017 Current $ / FY 2013 Constant $ x 100214 
 
Converting current dollars to constant dollars this thesis exploits two equations below  
 
Constant $=Current $ /Deflator x 100 
 
FY 2013 Constant $ / Deflator x 100 
 
Through these equations, this thesis can continue to use new total U.S. military 
spending not including with the war supplement spending for the FY 2013 constant 
dollars, and evaluate the consistency of data.  
 
1. Data of Total U.S. Military Spending Not Including the War 
Supplement Spending 
As noted above, this thesis attenuates effects of the war supplement spending to 
total U.S. military spending, and this category of total U.S. military spending is adjusted 
to diminish the effects of the war supplement spending since 2001 through the above 




equations. In addition, for consistency of data, this thesis uses the TOA and the FT 2013 
constant dollars in this category, as displayed in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Total U.S. Military Spending TOA Not Including War Supplement 
Spending (FY2013 Constant Dollars in Millions)215 
Year Total  Year Total Year Total Year Total Year Total 
1953 504,865 1965 424,367 1977 406,166 1989 540,004 2001 382,715 
1954 381,633 1966 501,858 1978 403,944 1990 525,426 2002 450.318 
1955 390,964 1967 540,377 1979 402,781 1991 531,581 2003 462,783 
1956 409,238 1968 546,853 1980 409,588 1992 480,350 2004 407,907 
1957 415,861 1969 543,490 1981 450,997 1993 450,504 2005 500,597 
1958 415,414 1970 499,212 1982 496,858 1994 412,214 2006 468,024 
1959 410,400 1971 452,610 1983 529,392 1995 408,020 2007 463,094 
1960 388,531 1972 436,982 1984 553,710 1996 399,468 2008  487,771 
1961 415,419 1973 414,727 1985 577,427 1997 389,040 2009 526,085 
1962 447,017 1974 393,878 1986 568,479 1998 384,979 2010 514,736 
1963 435,928 1975 383,461 1987 561,953 1999 395,696 2011 502,006 
1964 435,236 1976 386,446 1988 551,743 2000 405,356 2012 507,300 
 
To compare the total U.S. military spending not including war supplement 
spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the mean values of divided periods 
provide an analysis of both variables. In addition, this thesis analyzes three categories of 
total U.S. military spending through a consistent process. Thus, this thesis utilizes the 
mean values for comparison with the levels of the cohesion, as displayed in Table 12. 
                                                 
215Depart of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimate for FY 2013 (Washington: Office of the 
under Secretary of Defense, 2012), chapter six, seven, and chapter two of the FY2017. 
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Table 12.   Mean Values & Coding Level of Total U.S. Military Spending Not 




Park Chung-Hee 1 
(1961–1968) 
Park Chung-Hee 2 
(1969–1979) 
Mean value 414,613 468,382 429.427 








Mean value 518,550 525,821 411,849 








Mean value 403,813 460,481 507,716 
Coding level 1 5 9 
 
As noted in Table 12, while the minimum mean value was 403,813 during the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration, the maximum mean value was 525,821 during the Chun 
Doo-Hwan administration, and the difference between both values is 122,008. To 
estimate a more credible pattern, this thesis divides mean values into 10 levels, and 
displays the results in Table 12.  
2. Relationship Between Total U.S. Military Spending Not Including 
War Supplement Spending and the Level of the Cohesion  
To determine whether a certain pattern exists, this thesis compares the total U.S. 
military spending not including war supplement spending with the cohesion of the ROK-






Figure 5.  Comparison between Total U.S. Military Spending Not Including 




3. Analysis of Figure 5 
Similar to the prior analysis with regard to the first category of total U.S. military 
spending, ratios between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and total U.S. military 
spending not including the war supplement spending change over time. The variations of 
the ratios are smaller than the first category, and the graph clearly displays a closer 
symmetry between the two measures, although it is hard to argue that two variables 
correlate with each other. In addition, the difference between the Cold War and the Post-
Cold War with regard to the ratios is less definitive than the first category, indicating that 
the difference between these two periods indicated in the first category may result more 
from the anomalous impact of post-9/11 supplemental spending than the end of the Cold 
War itself.  
Secondly, this thesis found the positive tendency between total U.S. military 
spending not including the war supplement spending and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
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Figure 4. In addition, the thesis found relatively small gaps between two variables in this 
category with the exception of President Ryo-Tae Woo. With these findings, this 
category shows more definitive positive tendencies in the Cold War than appeared in the 
prior category. By contrast, the positive tendencies do not occur in the Post-Cold War in 
this category of U.S. military spending. Thus, this thesis does not find a definite 
relationship between the two variables in this category.  
Unlike the prior analysis, both variables peak during the President Chun 
administration at the highest level. Although the positive tendency was not consistent 
during the Ryo Tae-Woo administration, this outcome is meaningful to explain the 
positive tendency during the Cold War.  
As a result, there is no definite relationship between the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance and the total U.S. military spending not including the war supplement 
spending. In addition, there remain some differences between the Cold War and the Post-
Cold War in this category. Although the positive tendency appears more definitive for the 
category in Figure 5, this thesis cannot argue that there exists a definite relationship 
between the two variables based on this figure. To provide further findings, this thesis 
moves forward to the third category of U.S. military spending.  
C. TOTAL U.S. MILITARY SPENDING PERCENT OF THE U.S. GDP 
The status of the U.S. economy has been heavily influenced by the total U.S. 
military spending. To adjust for this economic factor, this thesis utilizes a third category 
of total U.S. military spending as a percent of U.S. GDP. In fact, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides this data with high credibility for 
all countries. The data from the SIPRI, however, has limits for this thesis because it is 
only available from 1988. In addition, the National Defense Budget Estimates also 
provide this data in its last chapter. The data from there, however, is hard to make 
consistent with the prior two categories of total U.S. military spending. Thus, this thesis 
provides its third category of U.S. military spending without the two data sources 
mentioned at above.  
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Per the definition of current dollars and constant dollars, current dollars consider 
the effect of inflation. This category of U.S. military spending considers the relationship 
of economic factors to total U.S. military spending. Thus, to use current dollars is more 
proper than constant dollars with regard to the third category. In addition, to have more 
consistency with the above the two categories, this thesis uses the FY 2013 current 
dollars for this category, and total U.S. military spending TOA with FY 2013 current 
dollars. To estimate the U.S. GDP with the FY 2013 current dollars, this thesis uses the 
National Defense Budget Estimates FY 2013. 
1. Data about Total U.S. Military Spending Percent of the U.S. GDP 
To consider economic factors to the U.S. military spending, this thesis utilizes 
U.S. military spending as a percent of U.S. GDP as the third category. In order to achieve 
consistency with other two categories, this thesis proposes the use of the TOA and the FY 
2013. To adjust the influences by inflation, however, it utilizes the unified criteria as the 
FY 2013 current dollars with regard to both total U.S. military spending and U.S. GDP. 
Results of this by category are displayed in Table 13.   
Table 13.   Total U.S. Military Spending Percent of the U.S. GDP (FY 2013 
Current Dollars)216 
Year Percent  Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent 
1953 11.8 1965 7.2 1977 5.4 1989 5.3 2001 3.0 
1954 8.1 1966 8.5 1978 5.2 1990 5.1 2002 3.4 
1955 8.5 1967 8.8 1979 5.0 1991 5.2 2003 3.9 
1956 8.9 1968 8.6 1980 5.2 1992 4.6 2004 3.9 
1957 8.8 1969 8.2 1981 5.7 1993 4.1 2005 4.0 
1958 8.9 1970 7.4 1982 6.5 1994 3.6 2006 4.1 
                                                 
216 Depart of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimate for FY 2013 (Washington: Office of the 
under Secretary of Defense, 2012), chapter six and seven. 
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Year Percent  Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent 
1959 8.6 1971 6.7 1983 6.8 1995 3.5 2007 4.3 
1960 7.7 1972 6.4 1984 6.6 1996 3.3 2008 4.7 
1961 8.4 1973 6.0 1985 6.7 1997 3.1 2009 4.7 
1962 8.5 1974 5.7 1986 6.3 1998 3.0 2010 4.8 
1963 8.2 1975 5.5 1987 6.1 1999 2.9 2011 4.6 
1964 7.7 1976 5.5 1988 5.7 2000 2.9 2012 4.1 
 
To compare between total U.S. military spending as a percent of U.S. GDP and 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, mean values must be adjusted by the unified 
criteria. Thus, this thesis utilizes the mean values, and results from this category are 
displayed in Table 14. 
Table 14.   Mean Values & Coding Level about Total U.S. Military Spending 




Park Chung-Hee 1 
(1961–1968) 
Park Chung-Hee 2 
(1969–1979) 
Mean value 8.9 8.2 6.1 








Mean value 6.2 5.1 3.5 








Mean value 3.8 4.0 4.6 
Coding level 2 2 3 
 
 70 
As noted in Table 14, while the maximum mean value is 8.9% in the Rhee Syng-
Man administration, the minimum mean value is 3.5% in the Kim Young-Sam 
administration, and the difference between both values is 5.4%. To compare two 
variables, this thesis divides mean values into 10 levels, as displayed in Table 14. 
2. Relationship Between total U.S. Military Spending Percent of the U.S. 
GDP and the Level of Cohesion  
To determine whether a more valuable pattern exists, this thesis compares the 
total U.S. military spending as a percent of U.S. GDP with the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance. Figure 6 displays the results of comparison between the two variables. 
Figure 6.  Comparison Between Total U.S. Military Spending Percent of the 
U.S. GDP and the Cohesion of the ROK-U.S. Alliance  
 
 
3. Analysis of Figure 6 
Similar to the prior two categories, the ratios between the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance and total U.S. military spending percent of the U.S. GDP change over time, 
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The ratios have a tendency to move in the opposite direction from the prior two 
categories. For example, whereas there are positive tendencies with the prior categories in 
the Cold War, the positive tendency does not appear in the Cold War with regard to this 
category because the level of total U.S. military spending during the President Ryee 
administration was too high. Although there is also a specific category difference 
between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War, the reverse ratios appear in this category. 
For example, while the ratios of the prior two categories in the Cold War are bigger than 
the ratios of the Post-Cold War, the ratios of this category in the Cold War are relatively 
smaller than the ratios of the Post-Cold War. Moreover, there is a more definitive positive 
tendency in the Post-Cold War for this category rather than prior categories.  
Figure 6 surprisingly presents a positive tendency that had not appeared from the 
prior two figures. First, the Figure 6 presents the most positive tendency during the period 
from President Chun to President Roh Tae-Woo among the three categories of total U.S. 
military spending. Secondly, the figure also shows minimum gaps between two variables 
in a transition from President Kim Dae-Jung to President Roh Moo-Hyun. For instance, 
whereas there are large gaps between the level of the cohesion and the level of total U.S. 
military spending in the President Roh Moo-Hyun period with the prior two figures, 
Figure 6 presents an almost similar level between cohesion and spending in the Roh 
Moo-Hyun period. This outcome is valuable to this thesis because Figure 6 shows this 
positive tendency at periods when the prior two figures did not. 
As a result, there is no definite relationship between the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance and total U.S. military spending as a percent of the U.S. GDP. In addition, 
this category shows the reverse ratios compared to the prior categories. Hence, the 
findings for this category can supplement exceptions derived from Figures 4 and 5.  
D. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, this thesis provides valuable results from the research analysis.  
One result was that there is no definite relationship between the cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance and the U.S. military spending. If there were a distinct relationship, the 
calculations of ratios would show relatively straight lines.  Even though this thesis found 
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many positive tendencies between two variables with some categories or periods, it is not 
enough to argue that there is a consistent positive tendency between two variables.  
Secondly, this thesis found that there are specific differences between the Cold 
War and the Post-Cold War with regard to the ratios between two valuables that appears, 
in some form, in all three categories. Figure 7 displays the comparisons of the three 
categories.  
Figure 7.  Comparison to Three Categories of the Ratios 
 
 
As shown in Figure 7, even though the ratios of the third category present a 
reverse direction from the other categories, the specific differences between the Cold War 
and the Post-Cold War appear clearly.  
Finally, the total U.S. military spending as a percent of the U.S. GDP could be 
useful to supplement for periods that could not be explained by the other two categories. 
For instance, a definitive positive tendency during the terms of President Roh Tae Woo 
and Roh Moo-Hyun were displayed in Figure 6 only. With these outcomes, this category 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Under the new security circumstance with the rise of China and deepening nuclear 
threats by DPRK, the government of ROK needs to comprehend what elements are vital 
not to weaken the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Even with reductions of U.S. 
military spending due to the sequestration and other factors, there are growing voices of 
concern about the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance in the ROK. Does the ROK have to 
be concerned about this situation? The prior studies that focused on constructivist 
perspectives on the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance could not answer this question 
with support by empirical analysis. Thus, this thesis tried to answer this question properly 
by analyzing both variables, the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. military 
spending. To give an answer, this thesis explored whether a certain pattern between the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S. military spending exists. 
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS  
This thesis found valuable general observations between U.S. military spending 
and the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
1. The Cohesion of the ROK-U.S. Alliance  
To compare two variables, this thesis measured the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance from 1953 to 2012 by assessing three indicators, which resulted in definite 
characteristics of the cohesion. As shown in Figure 3, the ROK-U.S. alliance during the 
Cold War was more consolidated than after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, whereas 
the Chun Doo-Hwan administration had enjoyed a strong ROK-U.S. alliance, the 
Progressive governments of the ROK and Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun 
experienced the weakest ROK-U.S. alliance. Finally, the Lee Myung-Bak administration 
returned the ROK-U.S. alliance to a consolidated position.  
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2. Patterns Between the Cohesion of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and U.S. 
Military Spending 
To find out whether a certain pattern exists between alliance cohesion and U.S. 
military spending, this thesis utilized three categories of total U.S. military spending. The 
following sections summarize the characteristics of these three categories.    
a. Total U.S. Military Spending  
The first category is the total U.S. military spending adjusted by TOA and 2013 
constant dollars. As shown in Figure 4, there is no certain relationship between the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and total U.S. military spending for this category. 
Secondly, there is the striking difference between the Cold War and the Post-Cold war 
with regard to the ratios. Finally, while the positive tendency between two variables 
appears in the Cold War, it does not appear in the Post-Cold War for this category. 
b. Total U.S. Military Spending Not Including the War Supplement 
Spending  
After excluding post-9/11 war supplement spending from the total U.S. military 
spending, this thesis found a more positive relationship between the ROK-U.S. alliance 
and the U.S. military spending than in the prior category. However, it is not enough to 
argue that there is a definite relationship between two variables for this category, because 
the ratios still change over time in spite of smaller gaps between the two variables 
compared to the prior category. Secondly, there remains a difference between the Cold 
War and the Post-Cold War with regard to the ratios in this category, even though the 
difference is less definitive than the prior category. Finally, a positive tendency appears 
not only during the Post-Cold War, but in the Cold War as well in spite of the small gaps 
between the two variables.  
c. Total U.S. Military Spending Percent of the U.S. GDP 
The third category of total U.S. military spending considered adjusted for U.S. 
economic status periodically changing, and outcomes of this category are valuable to 
supplement the exceptions in prior categories. There are three definite findings in this 
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category as shown in Figure 6. First, there is no certain relationship as with the other 
categories. Secondly, there is the reverse of ratios for this category. Although there are 
specific differences between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War with regard to the 
ratios, these are in the opposite direction of the ratios from the other categories. Finally, 
this category had a positive tendency in periods that the prior two categories did not 
show, which could supplement interpretations of the findings in the other categories. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
Based on general observations, this thesis will develop policy-making 
implications. Prior to stating implications, this thesis analyzes the new security 
circumstance of the ROK because it is helpful to comprehend the implications, the 
anticipation, and the future research.   
1. A New Security Circumstance of the ROK 
The ROK faces a new security circumstance from strengthening nuclear threats of 
the DPRK, influence of a rising China, and the reduction of U.S. military spending.   
a. Strengthening Nuclear Threats of the DPRK 
The DPRK’s ambition for nuclear weapons increasingly drives the ROK concern 
about the security of the Korea Peninsula. The ROK military has had enough capability 
to cope with conventional attack by the DPRK, based on its dramatic economic growth 
since the end of the Cold War.217 The ROK, however, cannot guarantee the safety of 
citizens against nuclear threats of the DPRK. In spite of the DPRK’s bad economic 
situation and isolation from the international order, its leaders have unceasingly pursued 
development of nuclear programs and it has conducted five nuclear tests since 2006. 
Even more seriously, when the DPRK conducted two nuclear tests in 2016, it may have 
shown more enhanced nuclear technology than before, such as standardization of smaller, 
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lighter, and diversified nuclear warheads, to go along with the development of ballistic 
missile capacity.218 
b. Influence of China’s Rising 
According to Scott Snyder, “China’s core interest is maintaining a stable 
relationship with North Korea as a strategic security buffer.”219 With this core interest, 
China has sustained a vague relation with the DPRK, even though the Obama 
administration has continually suggested that China help more to prevent further DPRK 
nuclear tests.220 This posture of China helps perpetuate the unstable regional security 
circumstances created by DPRK nuclear threats.  
In addition, the ROK is getting more dependent on its trade with China.221 For 
example, the ROK’s trade with China as a percentage of its total trade escalated from 
8.2% in 1998 to 18.4% in 2006222, and it eventually reached 26.1% in 2013.223 This 
higher dependence on trade with China could adversely affect the security of the ROK. 
c. The Reduction of U.S. Military Spending by the Sequestration  
The U.S. Congress has planned to cut U.S. military spending under the policy of 
sequestration, which is part of the Budget Control Act of 2011.224 To control the rise of 
China and reassure U.S. allies in East Asia, however, the Obama administration 
simultaneously emphasized the Pivot to Asia or rebalancing policy in the fall of 2011,225 
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and stated that “notwithstanding reductions in overall levels of U.S. defense spending, the 
U.S. military presence in East Asia will be strengthened.”226  
Based on the findings of this thesis, which show that there is no necessary 
connection between U.S. military spending and ROK-U.S. alliance cohesion, the thesis 
carefully predicts that reduction of the U.S. military spending under sequestration may 
not influence greatly the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
2. Implications by General Observations 
As noted above, the ROK faces a complex security circumstance in Northeast 
Asia and the United Stated has focused on the East Asia region more than before. Under 
this situation, the ROK seeks the optimal path to maximize its interests the complex 
regional security situation. Even though the ROK-U.S. alliance has historically served a 
vital role for the security of the ROK, the ROK should recognize the proper extent of the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance that it really needs in new security circumstances.  To 
choose an optimal path, ROK leaders have to comprehend all the factors that influence 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. To build such comprehension with empirical 
analysis, this thesis researched the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and found several 
valuable outcomes.  
a. No Certain Relationship between Two Variables 
This thesis found that there is no certain relation between the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance and total U.S. military spending. In other words, the total U.S. 
military spending has not greatly influenced the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance since 
1953. In fact, this finding disconfirms all three potential hypotheses noted in the 
introduction. This finding, however, has significant implications. Through this finding, 
the ROK can relieve itself of unnecessary anxiety over abandonment caused by future 
reduction of U.S. military spending. For example, as noted above, the reduction of U.S. 
military spending by the sequestration may not influence the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
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alliance a lot, due to the rebalancing policy. This will be a valuable insight for ROK 
decision-makers as they manage the ROK-U.S. alliance in the future.  
b. The Specific Difference Between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War 
Even though this thesis could not find the certain relation between its two key 
variables, it found a notable difference between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War for 
all three categories of the U.S. military spending. In fact, prior studies regard the end of 
the Cold War as an important event weakening the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance in 
the Post-Cold War world. This thesis, however, found an empirical demonstration of this 
specific difference between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War, adding more 
explanatory power than other studies to observations of the weaker cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. alliance in the Post-Cold War. In addition, this finding points to another specific 
implication with regard to the new security circumstance. The rise of China, a specific 
difference derived from the end of the Cold War, may now be a key driver with regard to 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
c. Adjust to These Categories of U.S. Military Spending for Future Studies 
 All three categories of U.S. military spending are all useful to analyze the 
specific difference between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War. The second category is 
useful to analyze the positive tendency between the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance 
and the U.S. military spending in the Cold War. Even though the first category shows 
some gaps between two variables, it also shows the positive tendency. Conversely, the 
third category could be more appropriate to analyze the positive tendency between the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. military spending in the Post-Cold War 
period. Even though this thesis could not find any certain relationship between its two 
key variables, these outcomes from the empirical analysis could be helpful to future 
studies with regard to the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.   
C. ANTICIPATION  
Based on the preceding general observations, decision-makers should consider 
other factors than the reduction of the U.S. military spending on the cohesion of the 
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ROK-U.S. alliance. In this light, the following discussion considers the optimal path of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance focusing on the new security circumstance derived by the rise of 
China and the deepening DPRK nuclear threat. In addition, this thesis will anticipate 
future tasks to achieve the optimal path by using the three indicators for the cohesion of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance discussed in Chapter II.   
1. The Optimal Path for the ROK-U.S. Alliance  
This thesis suggests three methods for the optimal path for the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
a. Avoid the Entrapment Dilemma 
Under the complex security situation, the ROK should avoid the “entrapment 
dilemma”227 with regard to either the United States or China, in order to realize its own 
interests with regard to both economy and security. The Park Geun-Hye administration 
suffered this entrapment dilemma with regard to two issues, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Terminal Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).228 Even 
though the Park administration eventually made decisions participating in the AIIB and 
also locating the THAAD in South Korea, the courses of these decisions were not easy 
due to the entrapment dilemma.  
Ellen Kim and Victor Cha suggest that the ROK should overcome the “friend-
threat dichotomy”229 to avoid this entrapment dilemma, and that strong cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance enables the ROK to have better position in relation with China than 
weak cohesion.230 As long as the DPRK nuclear program continues to grow and China is 
unwilling to stop the ambition of DPRK, the ROK primarily has to consider a credible 
way to deter the DPRK nuclear threat through the ROK-U.S. alliance regardless of any 
anxiety this may create about the relationship with China. The ROK decision to accept 
THAAD in response to the fifth nuclear test of DPRK is an example of this necessity.   
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b. Diminish the Dependence on the Economy of China  
The deepening dependence on the economy of China could make it hard for the 
ROK to avoid the entrapment dilemma, and so the ROK should diminish its degree of 
dependence on the economy of China. Economics and politics cannot be entirely separate 
from each other in the contemporary world, and this biased dependence could influence 
vital political decisions related with the ROK-U.S. alliance. Thus, to avoid the 
entrapment dilemma, the ROK needs to diminish economic dependence on China 
because it adversely affects good relations with China with regard to both economy and 
security.   
c. Avoid Entire Dependence on the ROK-U.S. Alliance to Deter Nuclear 
Threats of the DPRK  
Entire dependence on the ROK-U.S. alliance for deterring nuclear threats of the 
DPRK could make it hard for the ROK to avoid the entrapment dilemma, and so the 
ROK should increase capabilities of ROK forces to deter not only the conventional 
threats but also the nuclear threats. As explored in the chapter two, the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance during the Cold War was much higher than the cohesion during the 
Post-Cold War. The relatively weak cohesion during the Post-Cold War, however, is not 
necessarily the wrong direction for the ROK-U.S. alliance. With the ROK’s Post-Cold 
War superiority over the DPRK in terms of economic strength and conventional military 
capabilities, the ROK-U.S. alliance has changed in response to changes in the security 
circumstance during the Post-Cold War.  
As noted in the prior section, like the specific difference between the Cold War 
and the Post-Cold War, the rise of China is a specific difference shaping the new security 
circumstance. To cope with this change properly and avoid the entrapment dilemma, the 
ROK should increase its own military capabilities to deter the nuclear threat of DPRK. 
The Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Kill Chain are examples of this 
effort. Meanwhile, the ROK-U.S. alliance has to rely upon the “extended-deterrence 
capabilities”231 to deter DPRK nuclear threats. As a result, even though the ROK-U.S. 
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alliance is still a core component for the security of the ROK, enhanced ROK military 
capabilities could allow the ROK-U.S. alliance to be more strategic and valuable for both 
countries.  
2. Future Tasks for the Optimal Path 
There are lots of future tasks for the optimal path of the ROK-U.S. alliance in 
today’s complex security circumstance. The following discussion uses the three 
indicators for the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance to present specific future tasks.   
a. Institutionalization  
The institutionalization of the ROK-U.S. alliance is most productive when 
following a cooperative direction, serving both countries’ common interests with mutual 
satisfaction. To step forward in this direction, both countries have to try to pursue 
cooperative institutionalization and revise the disputed institutionalization appropriately. 
The KIDD is an excellent example for cooperative institutionalization, which serves to 
“significantly advance alliance objectives by providing high-level political oversight and 
coordinating and integrating various defense consultation mechanisms between the ROK 
and the United States.”232 In addition, the Joint Conventional Provocation Plan (CPP) is a 
good case as well. Under this plan, the United States can assure the ROK that they will 
counter provocations by the DPRK together,233 keeping the ROK-U.S. alliance moving 
in a cooperative direction.    
By contrast, there are three challenges to solve in the disputed institutionalization. 
First is the SOFA. Even though two revisions of the SOFA have relieved some 
discontents of South Koreans about the unfairness of the SOFA, the revised SOFA still 
has issues to resolve, like criminal jurisdiction and civil case claims.234  
Second is the wartime OPCON transfer. Two delays of the wartime OPCON 
transfer resulted from external and internal factors. The USFK commander, General 
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Curtis Scaparrotti, described necessary enhancements of ROK forces for the wartime 
OPCON transfer in testimony to the U.S. Congress in 2015235; “C4 (command, control, 
computers, and communication system), the Ballistic Missile Defense (BDM), 
Munitions, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).”236 In order words, 
the ROK forces need to be modernized in order to command the Joint forces. To 
modernize the ROK forces, concrete institutional supports of the ROK-U.S. alliance are 
indispensable, but with these supports the ROK can prepare thoroughly for the wartime 
OPCON transfer.  
Last is the SMA, which is the most difficult issue to solve for the cooperative 
institutionalization. Donald Trump is elected as the next President of the United States. 
During the campaign, Trump clearly insisted that allies of the United States should share 
more burdens for the U.S. forces in their countries. By contrast, the ROK may try to resist 
sharing excessive amounts of burdens. Both countries are going to negotiate the tenth 
SMA in 2017 and need to find a compromise on cost sharing to maintain a bright future 
for the ROK-U.S. alliance. If one of these countries has more discontents about the 
decision of the cost sharing for the USFK than the other, it could be hard for the ROK-
U.S. alliance to proceed to the optimal path.  
b. USFK Capacity and ROK-U.S. Combined Exercises  
For the optimal path in the new security circumstance, both countries have to 
enhance not the absolute quantity of troop numbers or equipment but the quality of the 
USFK, such as in providing extended-deterrence reassurance. As noted in Table 4, USFK 
troop numbers have remained 28,500 since 2006, and this USFK troop level is unlikely to 
change significantly for some time in the new security circumstance unless both counties 
have severe tension with regard to the cost sharing as noted above.  By contrast, there is a 
definite task to enhance the quality of the USFK equipment.  
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The USFK should have enhanced equipment for extended-deterrence reassurance 
to respond to the strong DPRK nuclear threats. Even though this enhanced equipment for 
extended-deterrence could create tensions with China, especially in the case of the 
THAAD, the ROK needs to have the strong reassurance of extended-deterrence to 
confront the growing DPRK nuclear threat as long as China does not do more to stop the 
DPRK nuclear ambitions. The United States also thoroughly comprehends this ROK need 
and tries to relieve the ROK by providing commitments. For example, the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense “reaffirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen 
extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capability”237 in the 46th 
SCM joint communique in 2014. Based on this mutual understanding, the USFK can be 
equipped with a strong extended-deterrence capability.     
When it comes to the ROK-U.S. combined exercises, it is likely that the scale of 
the combined exercises will not change significantly for some time due to the pressure by 
China or the DPRK in the new security circumstance. The extent and quality of the 
combined exercises, however, could be enhanced. For example, during the Lee Myung-
Bak administration several small scale combined exercises were added, like the Max 
thunder, PENORE, and the ASWEX. Through these combined exercises, the ROK could 
enhance its combined operational capacity further, and it could ultimately be helpful to 
deter DPRK threats. As a result, both countries should proceed to enhance the quality of 
the ROK-U.S. combined exercises, but do so quietly so as not to escalate tensions in the 
new security circumstance.   
D. FUTURE RESEARCH  
1. The Process of the Research   
The research question of this thesis is how U.S. military spending has affected the 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance since 1953.  This question is derived from the anxiety 
of diminishing the U.S. military spending in the new security circumstance highlighted 
by the rise of China and deepening DPRK nuclear threats. This thesis wanted to answer 
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this question with empirical analysis because no studies have researched this question 
with strong evidence. To create the empirical data about both variables, this thesis 
measured the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. by using the three indicators in the second 
chapter and analyzed three categories of total U.S. military spending in the third chapter 
for the period from 1953 to 2012.  
By comparing both variables with three categories, this thesis could conclude that 
there is no definite relationship between the total U.S. military spending and the cohesion 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Even though this thesis could not prove the potential 
hypotheses by this empirical analysis, between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War 
periods it found a striking difference in the relationship of the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance and three categories of total U.S. military spending. Lastly, based on these 
general observations, in this concluding chapter this thesis presents the implications and 
the optimal path for the future ROK-U.S. alliance.   
2. Limitations of the Thesis  
This thesis has several limitations to answer the research question. First of all, this 
thesis could not utilize better categories of the U.S. military spending, like the U.S. 
military spending related to Northeast Asia and the U.S. military spending directly related 
to the ROK-U.S. alliance. Originally, this thesis planned to assess these categories of the 
total U.S. military spending. The research of these categories, however, was not available 
due to the limitation of data. There are two reasons for the limitation. First, this thesis 
could not access the “Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation”238, which 
could provide valuable data for the research of these categories. Secondly, even that 
source only provides data from 1978, so there is no available data from 1953 to 1977. 
Due to this limitation with regard to the data, this thesis could not research these 
categories of the U.S. military spending.  Future research could surpass this limitation of 
this thesis by generating such data from more primary sources.  
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Secondly, this thesis could not assess the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance 
within shorter time periods than it did. Originally, this thesis planned to divide the 
periods by utilizing not only the administrations of the ROK but also the administrations 
of the United States. In fact, to measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance annually 
is the best method to have valuable findings under this empirical analysis. To analyze 
cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance annually, however, is problematic if using the three 
indicators of this thesis. This is because these indicators utilize discrete events to measure 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance that would provide misleading impressions if 
measured within these annual periods. To assess shorter periods marked by transitions of 
the administration of the United States as well faces the obstacles of generating a similar 
length for each time period.  Thus, this thesis decided to divide the time period by the 
administration of the ROK to provide relatively even criteria for the whole period. Even 
though this thesis could not measure the cohesion using shorter time periods, dividing by 
the administrations of the ROK is valuable to research in its own right. This is because no 
studies have researched even this length of the time period to measure the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance.  
Lastly, the each method for measuring the three indicators to distinguish the 
cohesion level of the ROK-U.S. alliance may be limited in its explanatory power. In 
addition, there was another limitation in identifying appropriate data to measure the 
USFK equipment and distinguish it at certain levels. This thesis, however, tried to 
measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance by original methods for empirical 
analysis that are more extensive than in prior studies. Even though the methods have 
some limitations in demonstrating definite relationships among the variables, these 
efforts have provided valuable insights useful for policy-making considerations. These 
efforts also offer direction for advanced future research with regard to the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance.  
3. Directions of Future Research   
Based on these limitations of this thesis, there are several directions of future 
research to build further on this thesis. First of all, this thesis recommends future research 
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to deal with two more focused categories of the U.S. military spending—U.S. military 
spending related to Northeast Asia and U.S. military spending directly related to the 
ROK-U.S. alliance—to determine if these measures reveal a more definite relation with 
the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. For this direction, researchers might need to 
follow a complex administration process to access the data, or they might need to 
construct the data from multiple primary sources. Alternatively, researchers might deal 
with shorter time than this thesis due to the limitation of data.    
Secondly, this thesis recommends future research to try to assess the cohesion of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance within shorter time periods than this thesis, which would likely 
create valuable findings. For this direction, researchers should come up with a plausible 
method to evaluate the role of significant discrete events across such short periods, and 
explore more detailed events with regard to the ROK-U.S. alliance than this thesis has.  
Thirdly, the thesis recommends future research to come up with methods to 
identify indicators more explanatory power for measuring the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance. Even though it might be tough to create these methods, expanding the range of 
indicators will be helpful to strengthen the explanatory power for the combined research 
efforts. For this direction, researchers might have to focus on just one indicator to 
measure the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance and deal with shorter time than this thesis 
has done.  
Lastly, this thesis has had many trial and errors to answer the original research 
question during the research process, and it still has many limitations in answering the 
question. This thesis, however, is the first trailblazer to measure the cohesion of the 
ROK-U.S. alliance with empirical analysis, and the author hopes that this thesis will help 
future research about the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance to avoid repeating similar 
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